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Comment
PROGRESS IN GENDER EQUITY?: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
HISTORY AND FUTURE OF TITLE IX OF THE
EDUCATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1972
I. INTRODUCTION
Although Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments Act of 19721 twenty-three years ago to battle gender discrimi-
nation, gender discrimination in intercollegiate athletics is still a
serious problem nationwide.2 With fewer dollars available in uni-
versity budgets, achieving compliance with Title IX's requirements
is one of the most pressing problems facing universities today. Tide
IX compliance may lead universities to cut or eliminate varsity
sports programs, resulting, for many, in the loss of the opportunity
to participate in intercollegiate athletics. Nonetheless, universities
must balance these program cuts against the substantial cost of
noncompliance.
Congress enacted Tide IX to eliminate gender discrimination
in educational programs and activities receiving federal funding.3
Since Title IX's enactment, Congress and the courts have expanded
the scope of Title IX beyond its original aims. 4 These develop-
ments have sparked an explosion in Title IX litigation and have had
a dramatic impact on intercollegiate athletic programs. 5
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988).
2. In a recent survey conducted of National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) Division I schools by The Chronicle of Higher Education, women made up
50.8% of the undergraduate population and only 33.6% of the varsity athletes at
the average Division I college. Debra E. Blum, Slow Progress on Equity, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 26, 1994, at A45. Moreover, female athletes received only
35.7% of the money spent on athletic scholarships. Id.
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988). Tide IX applies to elementary, high school
and intercollegiate athletics. This Comment will focus only on intercollegiate
athletics.
4. For a further discussion of the expanded scope of Tide IX, see infra notes
26-87 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994);
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F.
Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), afftd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837
F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D.
Ill. 1993), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 USLW 3488 (1995);
(51)
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Title IX litigation has forced educational institutions to address
the inequalities in their athletic programs. Institutions that fail to
comply with Tide IX may lose all federal funding.6 Furthermore,
noncompliance by an institution may result in liability to an athlete
for monetary damages.7 As a result, many colleges have taken pre-
ventive measures to ensure that they are in compliance with Tide
TX.8 Such preventive measures include reshaping athletic pro-
grams in order to provide more opportunities for female athletes.
For example, some schools have increased the number of women's
varsity teams to reduce the disparity between male and female ath-
letes.9 Other schools have cut male programs to increase the per-
centage of women participating in athletics.' 0
Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1993); Tyler v. Howard Univ., CA No. 91-CA11239 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1993).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988). Termination of federal funding for Title IX non-
compliance has never been utilized and critics argue that Title IX's administrative
enforcement effectiveness is limited. See Carol Herwig, Gender Equity, USA TODAY,
July 2, 1993, at 12C.
7. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (holding
monetary damages are available to enforce Title IX); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area
Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding compensatory damages are avail-
able for certain Title IX violations). For a discussion of the necessity of monetary
damages in Title IX actions, see Pamela W. Kernie, Comment, Protecting Individuals
from Sex Discrimination: Compensatory Relief Under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 67 WASH. L. Rxv. 155 (1992).
8. Among the universities that have taken such preventive measures are Stan-
ford University, the University of Massachusetts (UMass), Washington State Uni-
versity and Villanova University. Stanford University officials decided to add three
more women's sports programs in the next three years, to offer 29 additional
scholarships to women athletes and to construct more playing fields and locker
rooms for women. See Tim Griffin, Gender Equity: Pros and Cons of Key Issue, ExPREss
NEws, Jan. 17, 1994, at 6C. UMass has added a women's crew team and a women's
water polo team. As a result, 54.8% of UMass athletes are male and 45.2% are
female, almost exactly the same as the undergraduate enrollment percentages of
52% and 48%. MikeJensen, In Sports, Equity Still an Issue, PHIIA. INQUIRER, Oct. 28,
1994, at Al, A1O. Sean Kelly, 'Nova Strives for Gender Equity, THE VILANOVAN, Oct.
7, 1994, at 1; Dave Koerner, Washington State University: A Model of Equity, Louis-
vn.xE COURER-J., Dec. 21, 1993, at ID. Villanova University has launched a five
year program that offers additional scholarships to women athletes, places partici-
pation caps on some men's sports and increases the number of women's varsity
teams. Bob Monahan, Women Get Boost at UMass: Proposal Calls to Add Crew, Water
Polo Teams, BOsTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1993, at 98. Washington State University's ath-
letic program reforms have resulted in a male-female athlete ratio that mirrors the
full time undergraduate enrollment, 53% male and 47% female.
9. For examples of institutions using a cutting of male sports method to
restructure their athletic programs, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
10. See Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, 35
F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 USLW 3488 (1995) (eliminating men's
swimming team); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (elimi-
nating men's wrestling team).
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The central issue in most Title IX litigation is whether a univer-
sity provides equal opportunities for both women and men to par-
ticipate in intercollegiate athletics.' Equality in participation
opportunities becomes an issue in the following situations: (1)
when an institution demotes a sport from varsity to club status; 12
(2) when an institution eliminates a team;15 or (3) when men's and
women's sports teams do not receive equal or sufficient funding.14
This Comment provides an overview of Title IX, focusing upon
the history of the statute and the statute's implementation regula-
tions. The overview is followed by an analysis of the congressional
actions and the benchmark cases which broadened the scope of Ti-
tle IX and sparked recent litigation. This Comment then presents
an analysis of recent litigation and concludes with a discussion of
the impact of these changes and the future of Title IX. 15
11. Title IX is used primarily by women who fall victim to discriminatory prac-
tices of college athletic departments. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1993) (noting female gymnasts and volleyball athletes brought suit claim-
ing Title IX violation for demotion of teams from varsity to club status). However,
recently Title IX has been the focus of two different types of claims. Male student-
athletes have filed gender discrimination claims under Title IX when their pro-
grams have been cut due to budget constraints. See KeLey, 832 F. Supp. at 239;
Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 990. For a further discussion of these cases, see infra notes
185-268 and accompanying text. Female coaches also use Title IX in claiming that
their compensation is illegally lower than that of their male counterparts. See Stan-
ley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994); Tyler v. Howard
Univ., C.A. No. 91-CA11239 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1993). For a further discussion on
equal pay in coaching, see infra note 297.
12. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1993). For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 88-117 and
accompanying text. Unlike varsity sports, club sports are precluded from official
competition, they do not receive funding from the university as a recognized
sports program and club sport athletes do not receive athletic scholarships. Cohen,
809 F. Supp. at 993.
13. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332
(3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd
inpart and revd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d
824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993). For a further discussion of these
cases, see infra notes 119-181 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892 (discussing lack of financial support in
demoted teams); Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 993 (discussing disparity in athletic schol-
arships between men and women).
15. For a complete list of legal resources discussing Title IX, see Linda S.
Calvert Hanson, Bibliography, Sports, Athletics, and the Law: A Selected Topical Bibliog-
raphy of Legal Resources Published During the 1990's, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 763
(1994).
1995]
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Title IX
1. Legislation
Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 to combat gender discrimi-
nation in educational programs and activities receiving federal
funding.' 6 The statute provides, in pertinent part: "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partic-
ipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance....
Although the language and purpose of Title IX are clear, the
scope of the statute is ambiguous. This ambiguity may be attributed
to the fact that Title IX was adopted by Congress without a formal
hearing or committee report, leaving little legislative history.' 8 The
lack of legislative history fostered much uncertainty and concern
about the statute's scope and its applicability to colleges and their
various programs.' 9 The concern over Title IX's potential effects
on intercollegiate sports prompted the introduction of the Tower
Amendment.20 The proposed Tower Amendment required that
16. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988). Title IX was enacted in response to hearings
on sexual discrimination conducted by the House of Representatives Special Com-
mittee on Education. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on H.IL 16098
§ 805 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Tide VI) served as a model for Title IX's language. Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-95 (1979). The language of Title IX is similar to Tide VI,
except Title IX substituted the word "sex" for the words "race, color, or national
origin." Id. at 695. Tide VI provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person in the
United States shall on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(d) (1988).
Moreover, Title VI provided the foundation for Title IX's purpose; Congress
intended for Tide IX to preclude the use of federal funds for supporting discrimi-
natory practices. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. As stated by Senator Pastore, "[t]he
purpose of Title VI is to make sure that funds of the United States are not used to
support racial discrimination." 110 CONG. REc. 7062 (1964). Similarly, Senator
Bayh stated that "[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which I believe
is needed if we are to provide women with solid legal protection as they seek edu-
cation and training for later careers .. " 118 CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972).
18. Jill K. Johnson, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpreta-
tion of the Standardsfor Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REv. 553, 557 (1994).
19. Id. at 557; see also Thomas A. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX 46
GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 34, 36 & n.11 (1977) (noting that only two references were
made concerning application of Title IX to sports).
20. 120 CONG. REc. 15,322 (1974). See generally MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE
SPORTS, INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS. THE UNIvERsrrY 1-148 (1990).
[Vol. II: p. 51
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revenue-producing sports, such as football and basketball, be ex-
empt from the applicability of Title IX.21 Congress rejected the
Tower Amendment and instead adopted the Javits Amendment.22
Unlike the Tower Amendment, the Javits Amendment did not ex-
empt revenue-producing sports. Rather, the Javits Amendment re-
quired the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
to promulgate regulations for intercollegiate sports that took into
account the nature of the particular sport.2 3
2. HEW Regulations
In 1974, HEW promulgated regulations for the enforcement of
Title IX.2 4 Pursuant to Section 106.41(c) of the Code of Federal
Regulations, an institution is required to provide equal opportunity
in athletics for both sexes. 25 Section 106.41 (c) sets forth ten factors
to be considered by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in determin-
ing whether a college or university is providing equal opportunity
in its athletic programs:
21. 120 CONG. REC. 15,322-23 (1974). After the passage of Title IX, it became
apparent that the statute could prohibit gender discrimination in intercollegiate
athletic programs. ELLENJ. VARGYAS, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO
TrrLE IX (1994). Through the Tower Amendment, certain members of Congress
attempted to have sports, such as football and basketball, exempted from Title IX
because they produced revenue and created the largest disparity between the gen-
ders in sports. Johnson, supra note 18, at 586. Under the Tower Amendment, a
sport qualified as a revenue-producing sport if it produced gross receipts or dona-
tions. 120 CONG. REC. 15,322.
22. 120 CONG. REc. 15,323; see also Cox, supra note 19, at 36 n.13.
23. Section 844 of the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88
Star. 612 (1984).
24. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1994). Section 106.41(a) provides:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate,
club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient and no recipient shall
provide any such athletics separately on such basis.
Id. at § 106.41(a). The regulations allow an institution to retain same-sex teams
provided that one of two conditions are met: either (1) selection is based upon a
competitive skill or the sport is a contact sport, or (2) the institution provides both
men's and women's teams in the same sport. Id. at § 106.41(b).
After the enactment of Title IX, HEW split into the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Department of Education. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd.
of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 & n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR), acting under the Department of Education's
supervision, is now responsible for Title IX enforcement. Id.
25. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994); see Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896
(1st Cir. 1993).
1995]
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(1) whether the selection of sports and levels of competi-
tion effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of
members of both sexes;
(2) provisions of equipment and supplies;
(3) scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) travel and per diem allowances;
(5) opportunity to receive coaching and academic
tutoring;
(6) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) provisions of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) provisions of medical and training facilities and
services;
(9) provisions of housing and dining facilities and serv-
ices; and
(10) publicity.26
After the publication of these regulations, HEW received more
than one hundred discrimination complaints.2 7 In an effort to
eliminate meritless complaints, HEW issued an official policy inter-
pretation on Title IX (Policy Interpretation) a28 The Policy Inter-
pretation provides a framework for universities and courts to assess
compliance with Title IX.2 9 Compliance is determined by evaluat-
ing three areas of an intercollegiate athletic program:30 (1) equal
opportunity for each gender- to participate in intercollegiate athlet-
ics;3' (2) equal availability of athletic scholarships for female and
26. 34 C.F.R § 106.41(c).
27. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896.
28. Id.; see also Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: A Policy Interpreta-
tion: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg.' 71,413 (1979) [hereinafter
Policy Intepretation].
29. Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,415-17. In 1990, the OCR pub-
lished an Investigators Manual to aid in identifying violations of Tide IX. OFICE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S
MANUAL 24 (1990) [hereinafter INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL].
30. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897 (holding university may still violate Title IX even if
it meets "financial and athletic equivalence standards"); Roberts v. Colorado State
Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that violation of 34
C.F.R. § 106.41(c) alone is violation of statute); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ.,
814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding violation of any prong of Policy
Interpretation test is violation of Tide IX); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F.
Supp. 578, 584 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (predicting success on
Title IX claims based on § 106.41(c)(1) alone). Further, a record of compliance
in one area cannot be used as evidence of a violation in another area. Cohen, 991
F.2d at 897 ("[A]n institution that offers women a smaller number of athletic op-
portunities than the statute requires may not rectify that violation simply by lavish-
ing more resources on those women or achieving equivalence in other respects.").
31. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1994).
[Vol. II: p. 51
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male athletes;3 2 and (3) equal availability of all other athletic
benefits. 33
3. Equal Opportunity to Participate and the Policy Interpretation's
Three Prong Test
The Policy Interpretation outlines a three prong test to deter-
mine whether an institution is providing an equal opportunity to
participate.3 4 For a university to demonstrate compliance with Title
IX, it must fulfill at least one of the following requirements:
(1) the institution provides intercollegiate participation
opportunities for male and female students in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments
in the institution; or
(2) the institution has a history and continuing practice
of program expansion for the members of the under-
represented sex that is responsive to the interest of and
abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) the institution's athletic program is fully and effec-
tively accommodating the abilities and interests of the un-
derrepresented sex.3 5
The first prong of the test provides a "safe harbor" for colleges
and universities.3 6 An institution is in compliance if the ratio be-
tween the number of male and female athletes and the number of
male and female undergraduates is "substantially proportionate."37
A fixed ratio has not been established.38 The regulations indicate,
32. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (1994).
33. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)-(10) (1994).
34. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418.
35. Id.
36. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993). Courts have
unanimously held that the plaintiff has the burden of proof in establishing that the
university has failed the first prong of the test. Id. at 901. See Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829 n.5 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580
(1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.Colo. 1993)
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa.,
812 F. Supp. 578, 584 (W.D. Pa. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978,
992 (D.R.I. 1992). If the plaintiff fails to meet her burden, a finding of substantial
proportionality is made and the inquiry ends. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen, 991
F.2d at 897-98.
37. Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418.
38. OCR states that "there is no set ratio that constitutes 'substantially propor-
tionate' or that, when not met, results in disparity or a violation." INVESTIGATOR'S
MANUAL, supra note 29, at 7.
1995]
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however, that a university is in compliance if its enrollment is 52%
male and 48% female and its athletic program is 53% male and
47% female.39
Both the second and third prongs of the test reflect the reality
that substantial proportionality is not always feasible. Under the
second prong, an institution may demonstrate compliance by prov-
ing that it has a history and continuing practice of expanding its
athletic programs. 40 The third prong requires that institutions
"fully and effectively" accommodate the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex.41 Accordingly, a university is in compliance
with Title IX if it provides sufficient participation opportunities to
interested and able members of the underrepresented sex.42
B. Judicial Interpretation of Title IX
Through the enactment of Title IX, Congress attempted to
eradicate gender discrimination in athletics and promote equality
in athletic opportunities. 43 However, Title IX lacked the enforce-
ment tools necessary to effectuate this change. 44 First, Title IX did
39. Id.
40. Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418. The burden of proof is on
the defendant to establish program expansion. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 n.8; Cohen,
991 F.2d at 902; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1511; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584; Cohen, 809
F. Supp. at 992.
41. Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418. The courts of appeals in Co-
hen and Roberts placed the burden on the plaintiff to establish that the interests and
abilities of the underrepresented sex are unmet. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 901-02; Roberts,
998 F.2d at 831. But see Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1511 (placing burden on defend-
ant); Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 854 (same); Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 992 (same).
42. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899.
43. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
44. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title
1X 9 U. MIAMi ENr. AND SPORTS L. REv. 1, 4 (1992) (discussing restricted applica-
tion of Title IX). Given the limited effectiveness of the statute, litigants have pur-
sued remedies under several alternate legal theories. Id. at 4. Litigants have
pursued their sexual discrimination claims under the due process clauses of both
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See, e.g.,
Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (discussing use of due process
in sexual discrimination claims); Yellow Springs Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp 753, 759 (S.D. Ohio 1978)
(holding association rule and federal regulations prohibiting mixed gender com-
petition in interscholastic contact sports deprives girls of due process under Four-
teenth Amendment), reu'd, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981); Petrie v. Illinois High
Sch. Bd., 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding due process clause was not
violated by association rules restricting membership on volleyball team to girls
only).
Litigants have also pursued claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988), alleging that their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
were violated. See Heckman, supra at 4. See, e.g., King v. Little League Baseball,
[Vol. II: p. 51
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not expressly authorize a private right of action. Second, most in-
tercollegiate athletic programs were excluded from Tide IX be-
cause they received only indirect federal funding. Third, Title IX
was silent on the availability of monetary damages. Through recent
case law developments and congressional action, however, the en-
forcement mechanisms of Title IX have expanded and those early
obstacles no longer limit Title IX litigation. This section briefly re-
views the expansion of Title IX by judicial interpretation and con-
gressional amendment.
1. A Private Right of Action
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court recognized a private
right of action in Cannon v. University of Chicago.45 The Court held
that although Title IX did not expressly provide for a private right
of action, the right could be implied.46 In Cannon, the petitioner
brought suit against two federally funded medical schools, claiming
that her application for admission was denied because she was a
woman. 47 The United States District Court for the District of Iii-
Inc., 505 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff alleging denial of rights guaranteed by
Fourteenth Amendment due to prohibition against women participating on all-
male cross-country team); Gilpin v. Kansas State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973) (plaintiff alleging denial of rights guaranteed by
Fifth Amendment due to prohibition against girls participating on all-male little
league baseball team).
Other litigants have pursued claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Accord Sullivan v. City of Cleveland Heights, 869 F.2d 961
(6th Cir. 1989); LaFler v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mich.
1982); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 14
(3d Cir. 1982); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Cape v.
Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletics Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976),
rev'd, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977); see Cynthia J. Harris, Comment, The Reform of
Women's Intercollegiate Athletics: Title 1X Equal Protection and Supplemental Methods, 20
CAP. U. L. REv. 691, 700 (1991).
Similarly, litigants have pursued claims under state laws that prohibit sexual
discrimination. Arline F. Schubert et al., Changes Influenced by Litigation in Women's
Intercollegiate Athletics, 1 SETON HALLJ. SPORTS L. 237, 254 (1991). See, e.g., Aiken v.
Lieuallen, 593 P.2d 1243 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (plaintiff alleging that University of
Oregon violated Oregon Equal Rights Act (ERA)). Some states have also passed
legislation prohibiting sex discrimination in athletic departments. Heckman,
supra at 4-7; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 126.21, 363.01 (West Supp. 1991); WASH
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.85.010, 28B.100 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (discussing
gender equity in higher education); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.2001 (West 1989).
45. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
46. Id. at 716.
47. Id. at 680. Cannon filed two complaints: Cannon brought one suit
against the University of Chicago and the other suit against Northwestern Univer-
sity. Id. at 680 n.1. Cannon also filed suit against the Secretary and Region Direc-
tor of the OCR. Id. Cannon contended that she was qualified to attend both
universities based on her grade point average, test scores and fulfillment of other
entrance requirements. Id. at 680 n.2. Both universities' admission policies re-
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nois dismissed the complaint because Title IX did not expressly au-
thorize a private right of action.48 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion, concluding that Title IX did not include an express or implied
private remedy.49
The Supreme Court in Cannon re-evaluated the lower courts'
findings in light of the four-part statutory interpretation test de-
vised in Cort v. Ash.50 In recognizing a private right of action, the
Court stated that the first part of the Cort test was satisfied because
the petitioner was a member of the class of plaintiffs that Title IX
was designed to protect.51 The Court also concluded that the sec-
ond part of the Cort test was satisfied because the legislative history
fused to admit an applicant over the age of thirty, especially if the applicant lacked
an advanced degree. Id. Cannon claimed that such policies were discriminatory
against women because women were more likely to be older applicants because
their education was more likely to be interrupted than men's education. Id. Fur-
thermore, Cannon claimed that any age or advanced degree requirement violated
Title IX. Id.
48. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd,
559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The district court con-
cluded that no private right of action under Title IX should be inferred. Id.
49. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 683. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that Congress intended the termination of federal funding
to be the exclusive means of enforcement. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559
F.2d 1063, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). After the court of
appeals decision, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, which authorized an award of attorney's fees to private parties in Title IX
cases. Id. at 1078. Subsequently, the court of appeals granted petition for rehear-
ing to consider whether the 1976 Act intended to create a private right of action.
The court of appeals concluded that the 1976 Act did not intend to create such a
right and its own original interpretation was correct. Id. at 1079-80.
50. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 683. In Cannon, the Court confronted the issue of
whether a private cause of action could be implied under 18 U.S.C. § 1331. Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Holding that no private right of action could be inferred,
the Cort Court established a four-part test to determine whether Congress intended
to create a remedy pursuant to a federal statute. Id. at 78. The four factors estab-
lished in Cort were: (1) whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special
class of which the plaintiff is a member; (2) whether there is any indication of
legislative intent to create a private remedy; (3) whether implication of such a
remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and
(4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter
involves an area basically of concern to the states. Id.
51. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694. The Court noted that it would have been hesi-
tant to recognize a private right of action if Congress had written Title IX as simply
a ban on discriminatory conduct or as a prohibition against the disbursement of
public funds to institutions practicing gender discrimination. Id. at 691-92. How-
ever, because Title IX was drafted "with an unmistakable focus on a benefitted
class," the Court found "reason to infer a private remedy in favor of an individual
person." Id. at 691.
The Court further demonstrated this point by discussing the alternative forms
of Title IX. The Court offered Senator McGovern's proposal as an example of a
simple directive. The proposal provided, in pertinent part:
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of Title IX indicated that Congress intended to create a private
cause of action.52
The Court also found that both the third and fourth parts of
the Cort test were satisfied. The third part was satisfied because a
private right of action under Title IX would facilitate the underly-
ing purpose of the statute by protecting a litigant against gender
discrimination.53 Lastly, the Court determined that because Title
IX dealt with federal funding, the statute did not concern an area
of law reserved for the states.54 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the fourth part of the Cort test was satisfied and that it was ap-
propriate to infer a private right of action.55
2. Direct Federal Funding
The effectiveness of Title IX in eradicating gender discrimina-
tion was also limited because most athletic programs did not receive
The Secretary shall not make any grant, loan guarantee, or interest sub-
sidy payment, nor shall the Secretary enter into any contract with any
institution of higher education, or any other postsecondary institution,
center, training center, or agencies representing such institutions unless
the application, contract, or other arrangement for the grant, loan guar-
antee, interest subsidy payment, or other financial assistance contains as-
surances satisfactory to the Secretary that any such institution, center or
agency will not discriminate on the basis of sex in the admission of indi-
viduals to any program to which the application, contract, or other ar-
rangement is applicable.
Id. at 693 n.14 (citing 117 CONG. Rc. 30,411 (1971)).
52. Id. at 694-703. The Cannon Court conduded that Congress intended to
create a private right. First, the Court pointed to statements made by members of
Congress which indicated that they assumed that private suits were authorized and
necessary to the enforcement of Title IX. Id. at 686 n.7. Specifically, the Court
quoted Senator Kennedy's statements made on the Senate floor: "As basic provi-
sions of the civil rights enforcement scheme that Congress has created, it is essen-
tial that private enforcement be made possible by authorizing attorneys' fees in
this essential area of law." Id. at 686-87 & n.7. Further, the Court reasoned that
Congress intended that Title IX provide for a private right of action because Title
IX was patterned after Title VI and Title VI was interpreted at the time of the
enactment of Title IX to provide a private remedy. Id. at 695-96.
53. Id. at 707-08. The Court further reasoned that "it ma[de] little sense to
impose on an individual, whose only interest is in obtaining a benefit for herself,
or on HEW, the burden of demonstrating that an institution's practices are so
pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of federal funding is appropri-
ate." Id. at 705.
54. Id. at 709.
55. Id. The Court concluded that it had a right to determine whether Title
IX had included implied remedy because "[since the Civil War, the Federal Gov-
ernment and the federal courts have been the 'primary and powerful reliances' in
protecting citizens against such discrimination." Id. at 708 (citing Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974)).
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direct federal funding. In Grove City College v. Bel 56 the Supreme
Court held that Title IX was applicable only to specific programs or
activities that directly received federal funding.57
Grove City College is a private, coeducational, liberal arts col-
lege, which received no direct federal funding at the time of this
decision.58 However, the College enrolled students who received
direct federal Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) and
Guaranteed Student Loans (GSL's).59 As a result, the Department
of Education concluded that the College was a recipient of "federal
funding" and was required to file an Assurance of Compliance with
Title IX.60 The College refused to file the Assurance of Compli-
ance and the Department of Education sought to terminate finan-
cial aid.6 1
56. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Grove, two
conflicting views existed as to whether athletic programs received the federal fund-
ing necessary to implicate Title IX. The first view was that Title IX was "program-
specific." The second view considered Tide IX to be "institution-wide." Johnson,
supra note 18, at 560. Proponents of the "program-specific" view contended that
application of the statute was limited to specific programs or activities that directly
received federal funding. Id. at 561. To substantiate this approach, advocates of
the "program-specific" view emphasized that the original version of Title IX had
been discarded. Kevin A. Nelson, Note,. Title IX. Women's Collegiate Athletics in
Limbo, 40 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 297, 300 (1983). The original version of Title IX
was applicable when any program or activity received any federal funding. Id. Fur-
ther, advocates of the "program-specific" view argued that Congress explicitly pro-
vided "institution-wide" coverage in other parts of Title IX, and, therefore, if
Congress had so intended, it would have indicated such coverage. Johnson, supra
note 18, at 562.
Advocates of the "institution-wide" approach argued that amendments re-
stricting Title IX's application to programs directly receiving funds had not passed.
Nelson, supra at 301 n.31. Advocates also noted that the regulations adopted
an "institution-wide" approach. Johnson, supra note 18, at 562. They also noted
that Title IX's regulations define a recipient of federal funds as "any public or
private . . . institution ... ." Id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1994). Lastly, advo-
cates believed that the remedial nature of the statute demanded the broadest in-
terpretation in order to achieve its goals. Claudia S. Lewis, Note, Title IX of the 1972
Education Amendments: Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language With Its Broad Remedial
Purpose, 51 Fop.DHA" L. REv. 1043, 1059 (1983).
57. Grove, 465 U.S. at 574.
58. Id. at 559.
59. Id. BEOG's are a type of government student loan. Id.
60. Id. at 560. An Assurance of Compliance is a HEW form drafted by a uni-
versity guaranteeing compliance with the requirements of Tide IX. Grove City
College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253, 255 (W.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd in part sub nom.
Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
61. Grove, 500 F. Supp. at 265. HEW sought to terminate the federal funding
received by the students of the College. Id. at 255. HEW initiated a compliance
proceeding, and an administrative hearing was held. Id. The Administrative Law
Judge concluded that the federal funding received by students of the College obli-
gated the College to execute and file an Assurance of Compliance. Id. at 255-56.
Further, the judge entered an order terminating federal assistance until the Col-
lege was in compliance with Tide IX. Id. at 256.
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The College and four of its students filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. 62 The
district court held that the BEOG's constituted federal funding but
that the Department could not terminate the students' financial
aid.6 3 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit agreed with the district court that BEOG's constituted fed-
eral funding.64 However, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's decision, holding that the Department could terminate the
students' financial aid to force the College to execute an Assurance
of Compliance. 65
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the re-
ceipt of BEOG's constituted federal funding, and, therefore, the
College was required to comply with Title IX. 66 However, the Court
stated that indirect funding such as BEOG's did not constitute fed-
eral funding to the entire College.67 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded, Title IX was only applicable to the financial aid program
62. Id.
63. Id. at 273. The district court set forth several reasons for its conclusions.
First, the district court concluded that HEW had no power to terminate the Col-
lege's GSL program as a means of enforcing Title IX. Id. at 268. The court found
the GSL program to be a contract of guarantee and to come within the § 902
exemption of Title IX. Therefore, Title IX enforcement was unavailable under
§ 901. Id. Second, the court concluded that HEW could not require the College
to sign an Assurance of Compliance because Subpart E of the HEW's regulations,
which prohibit discrimination in employment, was held invalid. Id. at 269. Third,
the court stated that HEW could base termination of funds on the failure to sign
an Assurance of Compliance. Id. at 209. The court determined that a termination
of funds under Title IX was authorized only by a finding of sexual discrimination.
Id. at 270. Finally, the court held that HEW was barred from terminating BEOG's
by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment without first affording hearings
to those students who would be adversely affected. Id. at 269.
64. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 705 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465
U.S. 555 (1984).
65. Id. The court of appeals reversed the district court on several grounds.
First, the court determined that the district court's finding that Subpart E was inva-
lid was incorrect. Id. at 702. The court of appeals noted that since the district
court's decision, the Supreme Court in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512 (1982), held that Title IX does reach discrimination in educational
employment. Grove, 687 F.2d at 702. Second, the court found that HEW needed
to show that the college had actually engaged in gender discrimination in order to
terminate federal funding. Id. at 703 (citing United States v. El Camino Commu-
nity College Dist., 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980);
Gardner v. State of Ala., 385 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045
(1968)). Lastly, the court of appeals rejected the argument that a due process
hearing was required for students whose federal financial aid was terminated. Id.
at 704 (citing O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773 (1980)).
66. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984).
67. Id. at 573. The Court found that the purpose and effect of the BEOG's
was to provide funding to individual students and the financial aid department,
not to attribute funding to the institution as a whole. Id. at 574.
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and not to the institution as a whole. 68 The Court further held that
the College's refusal to execute the Assurance of Compliance war-
ranted termination of federal funds to the financial aid program.69
The Grove decision effectively removed nearly every collegiate
athletic program from Title IX's reach because few athletic pro-
grams received direct federal funding.7 0 Dissatisfied with that re-
sult, Congress overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Grove by
enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (Restoration
Act).71 The Restoration Act adopted the "institution-wide ap-
proach," requiring an institution as a whole to comply with Title IX
if any of its programs or activities received federal funding.72
3. Monetary Damages
The Supreme Court removed the final barrier to Title IX's in-
effectiveness in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.73 Prior to
the Court's decision in Franklin, the circuit courts were split on the
issue of whether monetary damages were available to plaintiffs.74
68. Id.
69. Id. In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted the inconsistency of the Court's
decision by stating that "[a]ccording to the Court, the 'financial aid department'
at Grove City College may not discriminate on the basis of sex because it is covered
by Title IX, but the college is not prohibited from discriminating in its admissions,
its athletic programs or even its various academic departments." Id. at 601 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the effect of the "specific-program"
approach to civil rights laws, see Karen Czapanskiy, Grove City College v. Bell: Touch
Down or Touchback?, 43 MD. L. REv. 379 (1984).
70. In response to Grove, OCR limited its investigations of gender discrimina-
tion in athletics programs. P. Michael Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987: Revitalization of Title IX 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 149, 159-60 (1990).
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
72. Congress amended Title IX by replacing the words "program" or "activity"
with "recipient." See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa.
1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (adopting "institution-wide"
approach).
73. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
74. Both Title IX and its regulations are silent on the issue of monetary dam-
ages. However, there is support for allowing such damages. One theory support-
ing the allowance of monetary damages in a Title IX action is that Title IX was
modeled after Title VI, and Title VI allows for monetary damages. Heckman, supra
note 44, at 21-22. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin, some courts
allowed monetary damages if the plaintiff proved intentional discrimination. See
Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
monetary damages available for certain violations of Title IX; however, remanded
to district court where case was dismissed without compensatory damages being
awarded); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 884 n.3 (1st Cir. 1988); Beeh-
ler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Lieberman v. University of Chicago,
660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982). Contra Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1028
(1992).
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However, in Franklin, the Court unanimously held that monetary
damages are available in a Tide IX action.7 5
In Franklin, a female high school student alleged that a male
high school teacher sexually harassed her.76 The student filed an
action for monetary damages under Title IX. 77 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the
complaint because it found that Title IX did not expressly nor im-
plicidy authorize an award of monetary damages.78 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision. 79
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. Relying on its
decisions in Bell v. Hood80 and Davis v. Passam,81 the Court stated
75. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038.
76. Id. at 1029.
77. Id. at 1031. Franklin did not involve discrimination in college athletics.
Rather, Franklin involved allegations of intentional discrimination. Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617, 618 (11th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct.
1028 (1992). Franklin alleged that although the administration was aware of and
investigated the teacher's sexual harassment, they took no action to halt it and
discouraged Franklin from pressing charges. Id. at 618-19. Before filing suit,
Franklin filed a complaint with the OCR. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1031 n.3. OCR
investigated the charges and concluded that the school district violated Franklin's
rights by subjecting her to physical and verbal sexual harassment and interfered
with her right to file a complaint pursuant to Title IX. Id. However, OCR deter-
mined that because both the principal and the teacher had resigned and the
school had implemented a grievance procedure, the school was in compliance
with Tide IX. Id.
78. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1031-32.
79. Franklin, 911 F.2d at 618. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's holding for several reasons. First, the court of appeals found that the ques-
tion of whether a court could award monetary damages was unresolved. Id. at 621
(relying on Supreme Court's holding in Guardian Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 463 U.S. 582 (1983)). Second, the court of appeals concluded that because
Tide IX was enacted under Congress' Spending Clause power, relief should be
limited to what was equitable. Id. at 621. Third, the court of appeals concluded
that, absent an express provision by Congress or a clear directive from the
Supreme Court, the court could not award monetary relief. Id. at 622.
80. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). The issue confronting the Court in Bell was whether
a federal court could grant monetary damages to a plaintiff as a result of federal
officers violating plaintiff's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 679. Bell
brought suit against the FBI to recover damages in excess of $3,000 that he alleged
were sustained as a result of Fourth and Fifth Amendments violations. Id. The
Court held that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute pro-
vides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal court may make use of
any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Id. at 684.
81. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). In Davis, the Court determined whether a private
right of action was implied from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 231. Shirley Davis was hired as a deputy administrative assistant for Senator
Passerman. Id. at 230. Senator Passerman subsequently terminated Davis' employ-
ment because he believed his understudy should be a man. Id. Davis brought suit
against the senator alleging that Passerman's conduct constituted sexual discrimi-
nation in violation of her Fifth Amendment Due Process right. Id. at 231. The
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that, absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal
courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in an action
brought pursuant to a federal statute.82 The Court reasoned that
because both Congress and Title IX were silent on the issue of mon-
etary damages, monetary damages could be awarded if such dam-
ages were appropriate under Tide IX.83
The Court examined whether monetary damages were appro-
priate relief under Title IX by analyzing the legislative history and
intent behind the statute.8 4 The Court found that Congress made
no effort to restrict the right of action recognized in Cannon, nor
did Congress make any attempt to limit the remedies available
under Title IX.85 Thereby, the Court concluded that monetary
damages were available in a Title IX action. 86
IV. TITLE IX LITIGATION
The broadened scope and enforcement remedies of Title IX
have opened the door for female athletes and have offered them an
equal opportunity to participate in intercollegiate sports. Recently,
both male and female athletes have challenged university decisions
to eliminate or demote varsity teams. These athletes claim that the
university has violated Title IX by denying them an equal opportu-
nity to participate.87 The next section analyzes recent litigation ad-
dressing this issue.
Court held that monetary damages could be pursued absent a clear congressional
declaration prohibiting such recovery against federal employees. Id. at 246-47.
82. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033-34. The court stated that "[firom the earliest
years of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the judiciary to award
appropriate remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal court ... " Id. at
1033 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)).
83. Id. at 1034.
84. Id. at 1035-36.
85. Id. The two amendments to Title IX enacted after Cannon that led the
Court to conclude that Congress did not intend to limit the remedies available in a
suit brought under Title IX were: (1) the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Amendment of 1986, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1993), and (2) the Civil
Rights Restoration Act, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
86. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1034. SeeJohn Tortora, Note, Compensatory Damages
Are in Intentional Sexual Discrimination Cases (Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992)), 3 SETON HA.. J. SPORT L. 197 (1993) (discussing
inappropriateness of monetary damages).
87. See Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993) (female athletes sought to promote ice hockey team from
club to full varsity status).
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A. Cohen v. Brown Universitys s
In Cohen, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit established that "equal opportunity to participate lies at the
88. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd 991 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1993). In 1994, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement.
See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation of Dismissal in Regard to Equality of
Treatment at 1, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (No. 92-
0197-P) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
The Settlement Agreement specifically stated that it was not designed to
resolve or affect any claims concerning whether Brown was effectively
accommodating the interests and abilities of the members of the plaintiff class in
accordance with Title IX. Settlement Agreement, supra, at 1. The general
principle of the Settlement Agreement was to ensure continuing comparability of
the women's and men's varsity programs on a department-wide basis. Id.
Specifically, the Settlement Agreement addressed the following areas:
(1) Funding
The parties agreed that sufficient resources will continue to be provided to all
varsity teams to allow each team to continue to compete and that the University
maintains the discretion in distribution as long as it does not disproportionately
affect one gender in favor of the other. Id. Comparability is to be determined by
the nature of the programs rather than the cost based on either a team-by-team
basis or an overall gender basis. Id. at 5.
(2) Locker Rooms, Practice and Competitive Facilities
The parties agreed that locker rooms will be allocated equitably on a program-
wide basis among men and women student athletes. Id. at 6. They also agreed that
Brown would continue to ensure that practice and associated facilities and/or
competitive areas be maintained to the same extent for teams of both genders on a
program-wide basis. Id. at 6.
(3) The Scheduling of Games and Practice Times
Brown University agreed to continue its current scheduling practices. Id. at 8.
(4) Weight Room
Brown University agreed to provide access to its intercollegiate weight room to
all student athletes on a first come, first serve basis. Id. at 9.
(5) Program-Wute Financial Support
The parties agreed that Brown would provide equitable financial support on a
program-wide basis for equipment and supplies, video recording and playback,
training trips, post-season competition, travel and per diem and coaching
allocation. Id. at 10-15.
(6) Training Services and Facilities
The parties agreed that Brown would continue to adhere to its current
schedule allocating athletic trainers for home practices and home and away
competitions. Id. at 15. The Settlement Agreement also provided that teams
engaging in outdoor practices would have access to a communicating device to
contact a trainer in the event of an emergency. Id. at 16.
(7) Housing and Dining Services and Facilities
The parties agreed that Brown must continue to provide men's and women's
teams with comparable housing and dining services and facilities. Id.
(8) Publicity and Promotion
The parties agreed that Brown's Sports Information Director (SID) would
provide substantially the same amount of attention to the men's and women's
teams, and that as long as SID employs two individuals on a full time basis, one will
be responsible for the women's program. Id. Each media and recruiting guide
provided to teams will be provided in a similar format and comparable size. Id. at
17-19. Public address systems used to announce athletic competitions must be
used on a comparable basis for men's and women's sports. Id. Additionally, the
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core of Title IX's purpose." Further, the court upheld the applica-
tion of the three-prong Policy Interpretation test as the proper mea-
sure in determining whether the institution provided an equal
opportunity.8 9
1. Facts
In the 1990-91 academic year, Brown University funded a total
of thirty-one varsity athletic teams, sixteen male and fifteen fe-
male.90 These teams consisted of 894 undergraduates, 566 men
(63.3%) and 328 women (36.7%).91 These totals were significantly
disproportionate to the percentages of men and women enrolled as
undergraduates which were 52.4% (2,951) and 47.6% (2,683).92 In
May 1991, Brown University demoted four of the thirty-one varsity
teams to club status in order to comply with a university-wide direc-
tive aimed at decreasing its budget.93 The demotion eliminated
funding for men's golf, men's water polo, women's gymnastics and
women's volleyball.94 As a result, the number of athletes participat-
number of promotional events for home competitions must be substantially
equivalent for men's teams and women's teams. Id.
(9) Recruiting
The parties agreed that Brown would base its recruiting budgets on a formula
considering the needs of the teams and the competition, among institutions, for
recruits. Id. at 19.
(10) Admissions
Brown University agreed to ensure that women and men student-athletes and
potential student-athletes are given comparable consideration for admission. Id. at
20.
(11) Reporting
The parties agreed that Brown will make an annual report regarding its
compliance with the Settlement Agreement for the academic year just completed
to submit to Plaintiffs' counsel no later than June 1 of each year. Id.
89. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897, 903 (1st Cir. 1993). See also
Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,415-17. For a discussion of the Policy
Interpretation, see supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
90. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980. The following sports were offered to both men
and women: basketball, crew, cross-country, ice hockey, lacrosse, soccer, squash,
swimming, tennis, fall track and spring track. Id. Baseball, football, golf, water
polo and wrestling were provided only to men, and field hockey, gymnastics, soft-
ball and volleyball were exclusively offered to women. Id.
91. Id. at 981.
92. Id. at 980.
93. Id. at 981.
94. Id. at 980. Brown University initially classified the four demoted teams as
"club varsity." However, the teams were later categorized as "intercollegiate clubs."
Id. An "intercollegiate club" is a team which is permitted to participate in intercol-
legifite competition as long as it raises its own funds. Id. at 981. Unfortunately,
many schools with varsity programs are reluctant to compete against club teams.
Id. at 993. Once Brown demoted its women's volleyball team from varsity to club
status, some schools dropped them from their future game schedules. Id.
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ing in varsity athletics was reduced from 894 to 836, which consisted
of 529 men (63.4%) and 305 women (36.6%).95
In April 1992, members of the women's gymnastics and volley-
ball teams filed a class action suit against Brown.96 Plaintiffs alleged
that Brown's demotion of the women's gymnastics and volleyball
teams to club status violated Title IX9 7 and denied them an equal
opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics. 98 The female
athletes affected by the demotion sought a preliminary injunction
ordering the reinstatement of the women's gymnastics and volley-
ball teams to full varsity status. 99 The female athletes also sought
prohibition against any future elimination or reduction of the sta-
School officials at Brown University acknowledged that the "intercollegiate
club" level is clearly below the varsity level and stated that "athletes at the varsity
level are more skilled and the level of competition is generally more intense." Id.
95. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 992-93. The decision to cut these programs was
made in response to a university-wide directive to cut 5-8% from the budget over
several years. Id. at 981. Brown expected to realize a total savings of $77,800
per year. Id. The savings were apportioned as follows: (a) women's volleyball-
37,127; (b) women's gymnastics- $24,901; (c) men's water polo- $9,250; and (d)
men's golf- $6,545. Id.
96. Id. at 979. Suit was filed on behalf of plaintiffs and "all present and future
Brown University women students and potential students who participate, seek to
participate, and/or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics
funded by Brown." Id. The importance of plaintiffs' use of this language was ex-
hibited in the Second Circuit's holding in Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1993). In Cook, the Second Circuit vacated an order requiring Colgate to pro-
mote women's ice hockey from club to varsity status because the plaintiffs' gradua-
tion rendered the matter moot. Id. at 19. In Cook, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York held that Colgate's refusal to promote wo-
men's ice hockey to varsity status violated Title IX. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F.
Supp. 737, 751 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993). The district
court rejected Colgate's defenses that: (1) Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 prohibit
discrimination in an athletic program as a whole, maintaining that the decision to
retain women's ice hockey as a club sport does not implicate the entire program;
and (2) that it would be improper to compare a women's club team with a men's
varsity team. Id. at 742. A major factor relied upon by the district court was the
spending disparity in the athletic budget. Id. The court referred to Colgate's first
argument as "ironic" due to the fact that in the 1990-91 school year, the school
spent $654,909 on men's sports and $218,970 on women's athletics. Id. These
facts showed that in addition to failing to accommodate female interest, the uni-
versity had not provided financial equality across the entire athletic program. Id.
The district held that a comparison between varsity and club status was proper and
ordered Colgate to promote the women's club hockey team to varsity status. Id. at
751.
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
98. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980. Plaintiffs alleged that Brown's demotion of the
varsity volleyball and gymnastics teams exacerbated the university's discriminatory
treatment of women, making these athletes "second class status." Id. Plaintiffs fur-
ther asserted that the demotion exemplified Brown's continuing failure to provide
women with equivalent "opportunities" to participate in intercollegiate athletics in
violation of Title IX's prohibition of gender-based discrimination. Id.
99. Id.
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tus of women's athletic teams funded by the university.100 The pro-
hibition was to last until the percentage of athletic opportunities for
women was nearly equivalent to the percentage of women under-
graduates.101 The United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island concluded that Brown violated Title IX by failing to
provide women athletes with an equal opportunity to participate in
intercollegiate athletics.' 02 The court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion requiring Brown to restore the women's gymnastics and volley-
ball teams to their former varsity status.' 0
2. Analysis
In applying the Policy Interpretation test, the district court
found that Brown failed to satisfy any of the three prongs: (1) sub-
stantial proportionality; (2) continuing practice of program expan-
sion; and (3) full and effective accommodation.' 0 4 Brown failed
the first prong of the test because a 11.6% disparity existed between
the percentage of women enrolled and the number of participating
woman athletes at the university.'0 5 Despite their "impressive
growth" in the 1970's, Brown also failed the second prong by not
providing a continuing practice of program expansion for women's
athletics.' 0 6 The district court also determined that Brown had
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 999. Because women athletes at Brown were not receiving the
same opportunities as male athletes, the court concluded that Brown was not effec-
tively accommodating the interests and abilities of the women athletes on the gym-
nastics or volleyball teams. Id.
103. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980. In reaching its decision, the district court
considered the Title IX statute, regulations, Policy Interpretation, and INvEsancA-
TOR'S MANUAL. The district court used the Policy Interpretation and INIESriGAToR'S
MANuAL to evaluate what constitutes equal opportunity within the scope of Title IX
and to establish the specific criteria for evaluating athletic programs as a whole. Id.
at 988-89. The district court stated that compliance with 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) was
a two part process. Id. See supra notes 24-26, 30-33 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the two part process required. First, the university must comply with
the three-prong test outlined by the Policy Interpretation. Second, it must satisfy
the requirements of 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) concerning competitive opportunities.
Id. at 998-1000. For a discussion of competitive opportunities, see supra notes 24-
42 and accompanying text.
104. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 981.
105. Id. The court found that the demotion of the four teams left 529 men
(63.4%) and 305 women (36.6%) participating in varsity sports, while during the
same year 2917 men (51.8%) and 2716 women (48.2%) were enrolled as under-
graduates. Id.
106. Id. Since the late 1970's, Brown's undergraduate enrollment has con-
sisted of approximately 51-52% men and 48-49% women. Id. During this same
period, the percentage of intercollegiate athletes has remained fairly constant at
61% men and 39% women. Id. The only women's team added since 1977 was
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failed to comply with the third prong of the test by not fully and
effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of Brown's fe-
male athletes. 10 7
The district court did not require Brown to increase the
number of women's teams to comply with Title IX. l0 8 Instead, the
court stated that Brown could down-scale its varsity program or ex-
tinguish it entirely. 109 However, the district court determined that
if Brown insisted on retaining its varsity programs, it would have to
increase the number of women varsity athletes or demonstrate that
an insufficient number of women were interested or qualified to
compete at the varsity level. 110 The district court, in asserting this
proviso, implied that Brown was unable to make this showing be-
cause two female teams were waiting for an opportunity to engage
in varsity competition.'11
3. Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, Brown challenged the district court's interpreta-
tion of the third prong of the Policy Interpretation test.112 Brown
winter track in 1982. Id. The district court rejected Brown's assertion that equat-
ing "expansion" with increased numerical participation was overly restrictive and
that expansion should be linked to creating a better quality program. Id.
107. Id. The court stated that keeping the women's gymnastics and volleyball
teams at an "intercollegiate club" level was not sufficient to satisfy the third part of
the Policy Interpretation test. Id. at 991-92. The United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit expressed a similar view stating that "the institution can satisfy
the third benchmark by ensuring participatory opportunities at the intercollegiate
level when, and to the extent that, there is 'sufficient interest and ability among
the members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a reasonable expec-
tation of intercollegiate competition for that team.'" Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991
F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Policy Interpretation, supra note 28).
108. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 999. The district court was explicit in the exact
nature of the relief it was granting, stating that "Brown has wide latitude in struc-
turing its intercollegiate athletic program .... [It may] drastically reduce the
number of intercollegiate teams it sponsors ... or it may decide to eliminate the
varsity program altogether." Id.
109. Id. at 993. The district court noted that "the Investigator's Manual states
that 'Title IX does not require institutions to offer athletics programs nor, if any
athletics program is offered, is there any requirement that the program be particu-
larly good .... '" Id. (quoting INVESTiGATORS MANUAL, supra note 29, at 10).
110. Id.
111. Id. The court stated that it was only "marginally significant" that Brown
demoted two men's teams along with the two women's teams because males still
occupied a greater percentage of varsity slots than women with respect to their
undergraduate enrollments. Id.
112. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993). Brown argued
that the Policy Interpretation "countervails the enabling legislation [suggesting
that] to the extent students' interests in athletics are disproportionate by gender,
colleges should be allowed to meet those interests incompletely as long as the
school's response is in direct proportion to the comparative levels of interest." Id.
19951
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argued that female athletes are fully accommodated if a university
provides opportunities in proportion to the ratio of interested and
able women to that of interested and able men.113 Under Brown's
formulation, if 500 men and 250 women were interested and were
able to participate, the institution would only need to maintain a
2:1 ratio of student-athletes, irrespective of the male-female per-
centage of the undergraduate student body.1 14
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit af-
firmed the district court and rejected Brown's approach. 1 5 The
First Circuit held that "[t]he fact that the over-represented gender
is less than fully accommodated will not, in and of itself, excuse a
shortfall in the provision of opportunities for the underrepresented
gender."" 6 Thus, the court required Brown to provide each mem-
ber of the underrepresented gender with the opportunity to partici-
pate in varsity athletics in order to satisfy proportionality." 7
B. Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania"18
In Favia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's holding that Indiana University of
Pennsylvania's (IUP) termination of women's athletic programs vio-
lated Title IX.119 The Third Circuit held that when a university is
faced with making program cuts, it will not be allowed to terminate
any women's sports when it has failed to comply with Title IX.
120
1. Facts
During the 1990-91 academic year, IUP enrolled 10,793 un-
dergraduate students, 4,790 men (44.3%) and 6,003 women
(55.6%).121 IUP supported eighteen varsity teams with a total of
503 athletes, 313 men (62.2%) and 190 women (37.7%).122 In
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Under Title IX, as defined by the Policy Interpretation's three-prong
test, the underrepresented sex must be accommodated in and of itself and without
comparison with the represented sex. Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418.
The First Circuit found Brown's reading of Title IX flawed due to the extreme
level of self-compliance required by Brown to assess the interest level of each sex
and serve the interests of each sex. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899-900.
117. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899. The First Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for trial.
118. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
119. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 343 (3d Cir. 1993).
120. Id. at 335.
121. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 580.
122. Id.
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August 1991, IUP, faced with substantial cuts in both state and fed-
eral aid, was forced to make university-wide budget cuts. 123 Conse-
quently, IUP eliminated women's varsity gymnastics and field
hockey teams and men's varsity soccer and tennis teams for the
1992-93 season. 124 After these cutbacks, IUP's varsity athletics pro-
gram consisted of 397 athletes, 248 men (63.49%) and 149 women
(36.51%).*125 JUP also decreased athletic scholarship awards.12 6 In
1990-91, IUP awarded $314,178 in athletic scholarships with female
athletes receiving, in aggregate, $67,423 (21%).127
In October of 1992, members of the women's gymnastics and
field hockey teams brought a class action suit against IUP in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania.1 28 Plaintiffs alleged that IUP systematically discriminated
against female athletes in its intercollegiate athletic program in vio-
lation of Title IX.129 Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction or-
dering IUP to reinstate the women's teams and prohibit further
elimination of other women's teams.130 The district court granted
the injunction.131
123. Id. In 1991, IUP, like Brown University, was faced with severe financial
problems. In response to the financial situation, the Department of Athletics was
forced to reduce its budget by $350,000. Id.
124. Id. TUP has three categories of athletic teams: (1) intercollegiate varsity
teams, which belong to the NCAA and bring the most money and prestige to the
university; (2) club teams, which are informal, basically student-run organizations;
and (3) intramural teams, which are open to all students. Id. The university pro-
vides its varsity teams with full and part-time coaches, designated schedules, rules
and regulations, access to ice, water, storage and locker space, professional and
athletic trainers and a traveling budget for away games. Id. IUP does not provide
the same assistance to club teams and intramural teams. Id. At the time of the
1991 cutback, IUP had roughly eighteen varsity sports, eighteen dub sports and
forty-four intramural sports. Id. Half of the eighteen varsity sports were female.
Id.
125. Id. Plaintiffs also submitted evidence which established program-wide in-
equality favoring men's athletics. Id. Plaintiffs demonstrated that men's football
and basketball teams were given more scholarships than other sports; certain
men's facilities were better maintained than the women's facilities; incentives were
offered for students to attend men's games; and the university provided country
club memberships and complimentary use of cars for coaches of male teams. Id. at
582.
126. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 582.
127. Id. The school estimated its 1991 cutbacks saved $110,000 as a result of
terminating the women's teams and only $35,000 from eliminating the men's
teams. Id.
128. Id. at 578.
129. Id. at 579. The action against IUP was brought on behalf of the female
students or potential students who participate, seek to participate or are deterred
from participating in intercollegiate athletics sponsored by IUP. Id.
130. Id. at 585.
131. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585.
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2. Analysis
a. District Court Decision
Based on the Policy Interpretation's three-pronged test, the
district court determined that IUP did not comply with Title IX.13 2
In applying the first prong of the test, the district court found that
IUP failed to establish substantial proportionality between the per-
centage of women athletes and undergraduates.13 3 The district
court explained that the 1991 cuts resulted in a decrease in an al-
ready disproportionately low percentage of female athletes.134 The
district court also determined that by eliminating women's athletic
teams, IUP failed the second prong because it was unable to
demonstrate a continuing practice of "expanding athletic opportu-
nities." 13 5 The district court noted that IUP had exhibited a history
of program expansion for women's athletics.13 6 However, IUP's
record since the 1991 cuts did not demonstrate a continuance of
this practice.13 7 Therefore, the district court concluded that IUP
could not satisfy the second prong of the test.'38
Finally, the district court concluded that IUP failed the third
prong of the test because it was unable to show that it had fully and
effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of female ath-
letes.' 3 9 The district court found that the previous existence of wo-
men varsity teams indicated that the interests and abilities of many
female athletes at IUP remained unaccommodated.' 40 Finding that
132. Id. at 584. For a discussion of the Policy Interpretation, see supra notes 27-
42 and accompanying text.
133. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584.
134. Id. at 584-85. Before the 1991 cuts, although only 37.7% of the univer-
sity's intercollegiate athletes were women, 55.6% of the student body was women.
Id. After the cuts, the percentage of women athletes decreased to 36.5%. Id. at
585.
135. Id. The second prong of the Policy Interpretation test requires a univer-
sity to have a history and continuing practice of program expansion for members
of an underrepresented sex that is responsive to the interest and abilities of the
members of that sex. Id. (citing Policy Interpretation, supra note 28).
136. Id.
137. Id. The court found that "[since 1991] the level of opportunities for
women to compete went from low to lower, and the 1991 cuts were not responsive
to the needs, interests, and abilities of women students." Id.
138. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585.
139. Id. IUP continued to honor the scholarships of those women whose
teams had been eliminated. Id. IUP offered to assist athletes in transferring to
other schools and promised to upgrade the women's soccer team to varsity status.
Id. However, these actions were insufficient to satisfy the third prong of the Policy
Interpretation test. Id.
140. Id. The district court found that IUP failed to recognize the obvious
desire of women athletes to compete in certain sports. Id.
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lUP had failed each prong of the test, the district court granted
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered rein-
statement of the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams.
14 1
Two months after the preliminary injunction was issued, IUP
filed a motion to modify the preliminary injunction.1 42 The univer-
sity sought to modify the order by attempting to substitute a wo-
men's soccer team for a women's gymnastics team. 143 IUP argued
that women's soccer would further the goals of Title IX by creating
more participation opportunities for female athletes and that the
substitution would save the athletic department money.144 IUP fur-
ther argued that the money saved by substituting women's soccer
for gymnastics would be used to recruit more female athletes in
other sports.145 The district court denied IUP's motion, stating that
if it were to permit the school to dissolve the gymnastics team it
would, in effect, make "the original plaintiffs [who prevailed] in
this case losers."146 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding.14 7
b. Decision of the Court of Appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did
not conduct an independent analysis of IUP's compliance with Ti-
de IX. Rather, the court considered whether the district court
abused its discretion by denying IUP's motion to modify the prelim-
141. Id. In response to the Tide IX violations, the court ordered IUP: (1) to
restore the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams to their former status in
the intercollegiate athletic program; (2) to provide the coaching staff, uniforms,
equipment, facilities, publicity, travel opportunities and all other incidentals of an
intercollegiate athletic team to the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams on
a basis equal to that provided during the 1991-92 school year; and (3) to fund the
two teams in an amount equal to that provided during the previous school year.
Id. at 578.
142. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 1993).
143. Id.
144. Id. IUP asserted that the modification would increase the percentage of
females participating in athletics from the current 39% to 43% and that it would
reduce the imbalance between male and female athletic opportunities to a greater
extent than by adding field hockey and gymnastics. Id. Moreover, the modifica-
tion would parallel a national trend toward female participation in soccer. Id. IUP
also argued that this arrangement would save the athletic department money, due
in part to the lesser equipment costs. Id. at 342 n.17.
145. Id. at 342.
146. Id. at 336-37 (quoting Appellants' Appendix at 167). The district court
denied IUP's request for modification of the injunction because IUP had failed to
show that the circumstances had changed "enough to make continued enforce-
ment of the [preliminary] injunction inequitable." Id. at 335.
147. Favia, 7 F.3d at 335.
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inary injunction.' 48 The Third Circuit found that the proposed
substitution would bring IUP closer to compliance and that the re-
placement of the gymnastics program with the soccer program
would increase the percentage of female athletes.1 49 However, the
court observed that the substitution would decrease the overall per-
centage of athletic expenditures for women, thereby, moving IUP
further from the goals of Title IX.150 Therefore, the court held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion.' 5 '
By not allowing IUP to rearrange its program in an attempt to
comply with Title IX, the Third Circuit signaled that athletic pro-
grams will be analyzed based upon the Policy Interpretation's three-
part test. Further, the court established that fulfillment of the Pol-
icy Interpretation's third prong will be extremely difficult if a uni-
versity eliminates any women's team.1 52 The next case reflects a
similar approach.
C. Roberts v. Colorado State University153
In Roberts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that Colorado State Uni-
versity (CSU) failed to satisfy the Policy Interpretation's three-
prong test.154 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the idea
that equal opportunity to participate is the key to Title IX
compliance.155
148. Id. at 340.
149. Id. at 342. The Third Circuit found that modification of the injunction
would increase the percentage of female athletes from 38.97% to 43.02%. Id.
150. Id. at 343. The statistics suggest that although women's participation in
athletics would increase by substituting soccer for gymnastics, expenditures would
be reduced from $150,000 (gymnastics) to $50,000 (soccer). Id.
151. Id. at 344. The Third Circuit added that nothing in the order would
prevent IUP from adding the soccer team and keeping gymnastics in order to
bring itself closer to Title IX compliance. Id. Further, the Third Circuit held that
the non-competitive status of three members of the gymnastics team did not re-
quire a mandate of relief prior to the entry of a final injunction in order to arrive
at equitibility. Id. at 344 n.23.
152. Johnson, supra note 18, at 582.
153. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub norn.
Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 580 (1993).
154. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
155. Id. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text for a complete discus-
sion of the Policy Interpretation three-part test.
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1. Facts
During the 1991-92 academic year, CSU funded seventeen var-
sity teams for both male and female athletes, with women compris-
ing 35.2% of the total athletes. 156 In the same year, women
comprised 47.9% of the undergraduate student population.1 57 In
June 1992, CSU faced financial problems due to state cutbacks and
eliminated the women's varsity softball and the men's varsity base-
ball programs. 158 After the elimination of the programs, women
comprised 37.7% of the varsity athletes and 48.2% of the total un-
dergraduate population.15 9
The members of the women's varsity softball team filed suit
against CSU in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. 160 Plaintiffs claimed that the university violated Title IX
by denying them an equal opportunity to participate in intercollegi-
ate athletics. 161 Plaintiffs sought the reinstatement of the varsity
softball team and additional relief in the form of monetary
damages.162
a. District Court Decision
The district court concluded that CSU's athletic program did
not satisfy the first prong of the Policy Interpretation test.163 CSU
argued that the 10.6% disparity between the number of female ath-
letes and the number of female undergraduates was substantially
proportionate. 64 The district court ruled that the 10.6% disparity
was not substantially proportionate. 65
156. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1512. From 1980 to 1993, the average disparity
between enrollment and athletic participation rates for women was 14.1%. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1509. Women's softball and men's baseball provided participation
opportunities for eighteen women and fifty-five men. Id. at 1514.
159. Id. at 1512. Prior to the 1992 cuts, the disparity between the percentage
of women enrolled at CSU and the percentage of women participating in athletics
at CSU was 12.7%. Id. Subsequent to the cuts, the disparity was 10.5%. Id.
160. Id.
161. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1512.
162. Id. at 1509-10.
163. Id. at 1513. Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 54) of Dr.
Mary Gray, a professor of mathematics and statistics at American University, which
stated that the difference between the proportion of the total women student pop-
ulation and the total women student athlete population at CSU is statistically sig-
nificant and that the pattern had developed over the last ten years and not merely
by chance. Id.
164. Id. CSU officials believed that 10.6% was an acceptable disparity.
Although a set ratio has not been established, there have been general standards
established. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
165. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1516. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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The district court also concluded that CSU was unable to meet
the second prong of the test because CSU did not have a continu-
ing practice of program expansion.166 Although CSU instituted sev-
eral women's teams in the 1970's, it had not added any women's
teams in twelve years) 67 In arriving at its decision, the district court
further noted that CSU had failed to respond to a 1983 Title IX
compliance review of CSU's athletic department by the OCR-168
That investigation found that "benefits, opportunities, and treat-
ment [were] not equivalent in the areas of equipment and supplies,
locker rooms, coaching, recruitment, publicity, support services
and the, effective accommodation of student interests and abili-
ties."169 The district court found that the university had not taken
appropriate remedial action.1 70
The district court also concluded that CSU failed to meet the
requirements of the third prong by failing to accommodate effec-
tively and fully the interests and abilities of its female athletes.171
The district court determined there was enough interest and talent
existing among women undergraduates to require CSU to fund
women's softball.' 72 Based on CSU's failure to comply with at least
one prong of the three-prong test set forth in the Policy Interpreta-
tion, the district court ordered reinstatement of the softball
team. 173
166. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1516. This is based on the standard set by the
second prong of the Policy Interpretation test and the courts' findings in both
Cohen and Favia. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Tide IX compliance by expanding the underrepresented gender's athletic
program.
167. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1515.
168. Id. The district court recognized that CSU was put "on notice" that fe-
male athletes' participation rates were not substantially proportionate to female
undergraduate enrollment. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. This is violative of the third prong of the Policy Interpretation test
requiring a showing that an institution's athletic program is fully and effectively
accommodating the abilities and interests of the underrepresented sex.
171. Id. at 1517.
172. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1517. Plaintiffs Jennifer Roberts and Aimee Rice
Ainsworth testified persuasively at trial about their dedication to softball and the
amount of time they had invested in training for their participation. Id. The wo-
men also noted that the team finished third in the Western Athletic Conference in
1992. Id.
173. Id. at 1518. The district court issued a permanent injunction requiring
CSU to reinstate the women's intercollegiate softball program and to provide the
women's softball team with all of the incidental benefits accorded other varsity
teams at CSU. Id.
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b. Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the injunction and upheld the district court's find-
ings.' 74 The Tenth Circuit recognized that in times of financial
hardship, universities will face difficulty in continuing a practice of
expansion. 75 However, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
court's conclusion that the plain language of the statute requires a
continuing practice of expansion.1 76 The Tenth Circuit further
noted that expansion cannot be attained by eliminating both wo-
men's and men's teams in order to increase the percentage of fe-
male athletic opportunities.177
The Tenth Circuit similarly rejected CSU's interpretation of
the third prong of the Policy Interpretation test.'78 CSU argued
that even if there was interest and ability among the female student
body, the statute only requires that the university accommodate the
women to the extent it accommodates the men.179 Based on this
argument, CSU stated that members of the women's softball team
had no basis for relief because the university also eliminated the
men's baseball team. 80 Relying on the reasoning in Cohen, the
Tenth Circuit rejected this argument and stated that the statute re-
quires full and effective accommodation of the underrepresented
sex regardless of opportunities for the overrepresented sex.' 8 ' The
Tenth Circuit concluded that, based on the findings of fact by
the district court, plaintiffs had met the burden of showing that
CSU had not accommodated their interests and abilities fully and
effectively.' 82
174. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993). The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed the district
court's order requiring CSU to organize a fall season for the softball team. Id.
175. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that the ordinary meaning of the word "ex-
pansion" may not be manipulated. Id. Compliance under the third prong of the
Policy Interpretation test requires "improving the relative percentages of women
participating in athletics by making cuts in both women's and men's sports pro-
grams." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 831.
179. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 832. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that
CSU had violated the third prong of the Policy Interpretation test. Id. The OCR
agreed that a Title IX violation is likely in a situation similar to Roberts.
OCR investigative experience indicates that where budget restrictions
have led a recipient to eliminate sports previously offered, there is fre-
quently a compliance problem with this program component. The ten-
1995]
29
Forseth: Progress in Gender Equity: An Overview of the History and Future
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
80 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM
As Cohen, Favia and Roberts demonstrate, compliance with Title
IX does not require a university to create women's teams where
there was no interest or expectation of competition.' 83 However, if
there is unaccommodated interests and abilities among female ath-
letes, current judicial interpretation suggests that a university must
provide these athletes with intercollegiate athletic opportunities.18 4
This poses an interesting question for male athletes who have been
stripped of their sports programs. As the next two cases point out,
males have not been successful in asserting rights under Title IX.
D. Kelley v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois8 5
Although Title IX provides a federal cause of action for gender
discrimination in intercollegiate athletics, male student-athletes tra-
ditionally have not alleged gender discrimination in violation of Ti-
tle IX. However, male athletes have recently turned to Title IX
causes of action in an attempt to safeguard male athletic programs
from extinction.' 8 6 The following is a discussion of the most recent
litigation addressing this issue.
1. Facts
In 1992-93, the University of Illinois (Illinois) enrolled 25,846
undergraduate students.'8 7 Male students comprised 14,427 (56%)
of the total undergraduate enrollment and female students com-
prised 11,419 (44%).188 During 1992-93, 474 athletes, 363 men
(76.6%) and 111 women (23.4%), participated in Illinois' varsity
dency is for institutions to eliminate a sport previously offered to women
who are already underrepresented in the institution's athletic programs.
The result has been that women are now more disadvantaged by the elim-
ination of a women's team despite sufficient interest and ability to sustain
a viable team. In this situation, the institution may well be in violation of
this program component. In effect, the participation rates of men and
women are not proportionate to their enrollment rates such that women
are underrepresented in the athletics program, and the institution is not
meeting expressed interests and abilities of female students. Therefore,
the institution is not equally effectively accommodating the athletic inter-
ests and abilities of male and female students.
Id. (quoting INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 29).
183. Johnson, supra note 18, at 588.
184. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832.
185. 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. 111. 1993), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 63 USLW 3488 (1995).
186. Id.; see also Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
187. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240. Illinois is a large state university with many
branches across the state of Illinois. The affected athletes attended the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Id. Illinois is a member of the prestigious Big
Ten Athletic Conference. Id.
188. Id. Total enrollment at Illinois has decreased since 1990-91. Id.
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sports programs. 189 On May 7, 1993, primarily in response to budg-
etary constraints,' 90 Illinois announced its intention to eliminate
men's varsity swimming, men's varsity fencing, men's varsity diving
and women's varsity diving19' for the 1993-94 school year.1 92
Although Illinois intended to disband the teams, Illinois continued
to honor the scholarships awarded to those athletes affected by this
decision. 93
2. Background
In September 1993, members of the men's swimming team
brought suit against Illinois in the United States District Court for
the Central District of Illinois.' 94 Plaintiffs sought a preliminary in-
junction ordering the reinstatement of the men's swimming
189. Id.
190. Id. The district court found that budgetary constraints were the primary,
but not the sole, motivation for the reduction in the athletic program. Id. at 240.
More than ten years earlier, OCR investigated Illinois and found it was not in com-
pliance with Title IX. Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 63 USLW 3488 (1995). However, OCR refrained from further action
based on Illinois' representations that it would comply with Title IX. Id. Clearly,
the threat of an imminent OCR penalty did not spark Illinois to action. The dis-
trict court mentioned that Illinois' athletic program faced a deficit of nearly
$600,000. Id.
191. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269. The teams were selected for termination after ath-
letic department officials evaluated the teams' relative opportunities for success in
the future. Id. Men's swimming was selected because it was historically unsuccess-
ful; it was not a widely offered high school sport and it had a small spectator follow-
ing. Id. Illinois apparently made no examination of the effect of termination on
the affected athletes.
192. Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Il. 1993), affl'd, 35
F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 USLW 3488 (1995). The district court
noted that during 1992-93, the total participation in athletics decreased, but men's
participation increased and women's participation decreased. Id. Illinois, in re-
ducing the athletic program, was attempting to comply with Title IX as well as with
Big Ten Conference requirements. Id. The Big Ten Conference gender policy
was implemented by the member schools to achieve a rate of participation of 60%
men and 40% women in varsity athletics. Id. The district court noted that compli-
ance with the Big Ten's requirements is necessarily subsidiary to compliance with
Tide IX. Id. at 241 n.5.
193. Id. at 240. Eleven scholarships were awarded to the men's swimming
team which was comprised of 28 individuals. Id. at 239. The women's team re-
ceived 14 scholarships for disbursement among 18 members. Id. By honoring the
scholarships, Illinois avoided any potential breach of contract claims by the af-
fected scholarship athletes.
194. Id. at 239. The male swimmers did not bring their action as a class ac-
tion, ignoring the lesson taught in Cook v. Colgate, 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y.
1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993) (suit by female ice-hockey players to
elevate team from club to varsity status was determined moot due to plaintiffs'
graduation). Failing to bring the suit as a class action might subject the plaintiffs
to an eventual dismissal for lack of standing.
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team. 95 Plaintiffs alleged that Illinois discriminated against them
in violation of Title IX because Illinois disbanded only the men's
swimming team and not the women's swimming team.196 Plaintiffs
also alleged that Illinois violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by terminating programs using gender as
the sole criterion. 197
3. Analysis
a. District Court Decision
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Illi-
nois and its co-defendants.' 98 In reaching its decision, the district
court first noted that Kelley was a case of first impression nation-
ally. 199 Although the district court recognized that Title IX itself
might be interpreted differently on its face, the court stated that it
must give deference to the prior case law and regulations behind
Title IX.200 Therefore, the district court held that Illinois' termina-
tion of the men's swimming team was in compliance with Title IX
because: (1) Title IX permits the elimination of athletic programs
as long as the underrepresented gender is not affected; (2) Title IX
permits disbanding the men's swimming team while retaining the
women's swimming team; and (3) the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment permits terminating a men's team
while preserving a women's team in order to remedy past discrimi-
nation against women.20'
In deciding the Title IX claim, the district court focused on the
third prong of the Policy Interpretation test,20 2 in order to invali-
date the plaintiffs' claims.203 Plaintiffs argued that the elimination
195. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 239.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 244. fllinois' co-defendants were various athletic department offi-
cials. Id. The case was decided on a motion for summary judgment when the
defendants' motion to dismiss was converted because the defendants included
matters outside the pleadings. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
199. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240-41.
200. Id. at 242. The district court noted that on its face, Tide IX might sup-
port the male plaintiffs' claim. See id. at 241. The district court noted that Title IX
has evolved from a pure discrimination statute into a statute that provides "equal
opportunity" for each gender in a flexible context. Id.
201. Id. at 241, 243.
202. Id. at 241. The third prong requires that "the underrepresented gen-
der's interests and abilities [ ] be accommodated by 'expansion' of the athletic
program." Id. (citing Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418).
203. Id. The equal opportunity provision of Title IX states that "a recipient
which operates or sponsors interscholastic or intercollegiate, club or intramural
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of an athletic program directly contravened the third prong of the
regulations which promotes expansion of an institution's athletic
program in order to comply with Title IX.204
The district court relied on Cohen for the proposition that elim-
inating athletic teams to comply with Title IX is within the scope
and spirit of Title IX.2 0 5 The district court thus implicitly author-
ized Illinois to reduce opportunities for the overrepresented gen-
der, rather than create new opportunities for the underrepresented
gender, in order to meet Title IX.206 The district court also
signalled that the women's athletic teams at Illinois are effectively
untouchable as long as women remain the underrepresented gen-
der.2 0 7 The district court's findings further indicated that Illinois
was not required to disband teams on an equal basis, as disbanding
a women's team would result in Illinois' further noncompliance
with Title IX.
Plaintiffs also challenged Illinois' actions on the basis of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 8 Plain-
tiffs alleged two violations of the Equal Protection Clause: (1) Illi-
athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes." Id.
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c)).
204. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 241. The district court found that:
Even if the University's decision were [sic] not based on financial or
budgetary reasons, but made solely to move closer to substantial propor-
tionality (that is, to increase participation opportunities for women to a
level equivalent with the percentage of female undergraduate enrollees),
the failure to cut women's programs would still be countenanced by Title
IX.
Id. (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993)). Further-
more, the district court stated that "[ulnder Tide IX, the University could cut
men's programs without violating the statute because men's interests and abilities
are presumptively met when substantial proportionality exists." Id. The district
court found that the percentage of male athletes was substantially proportionate to
the male enrollment. Id. at 242.
205. Id. at 241. The court quoted this key section of Cohen:
But, Tide IX does not require that a school pour ever-increasing sums
into its athletic establishment. If a university prefers to take another
route, it can also bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark of
the accommodation test by subtraction and downgrading, that is, by re-
ducing opportunities for the overrepresented gender while keeping op-
portunities stable for the underrepresented gender (or reducing them to
a much lesser extent).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993), quoted in Kelley, 832
F. Supp. at 241.
206. Kely, 832 F. Supp. at 241. The district court, while expressing its condo-
lences to the plaintiffs, noted that women as a class have "to pay for discriminatory
actions and attitudes which have historically excluded them from the athletic op-
portunities given to men, as represented by current statistical disparities among
athletes in universities and colleges across the country." Id. at 244.
207. Id. at 242.
208. Id.
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nois denied plaintiffs equal protection of the laws by creating an
illegal gender classification; and (2) the defendants conspired to-
gether to deny plaintiffs their civil rights in violation of Title IX and
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 9 Applying intermediate scrutiny to
these Fourteenth Amendment challenges, the district court found
that Illinois' actions complied with Title IX and, therefore, satisfied
the Equal Protection Clause.210 The district court noted that Title
IX is a remedial statute aimed at eradicating discrimination against
underrepresented athletes.2 1 Therefore, the district court held
that Illinois' "[c]ompliance with Title IX serves a remedial purpose
which qualifies as an important state interest which is substantially
related to eradicating historical discrimination against women in
athletics at the University of Illinois."212
The district court closed by acknowledging that the male swim-
mers were innocent parties caught up in Illinois' efforts to comply
with Title IX.213 However, the district court supports its unsympa-
thetic position by saying that innocent parties must share the bur-
den in order to remedy past discrimination.214
b. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Illinois to the United States Court of Appeals for
209. Id. To succeed on an Equal Protection claim, "a plaintiff must allege
that the government intentionally discriminated against plaintiff by classifying him
or her for different treatment under the law than one similarly situated." Id.
Clearly, Illinois as a state-run university was a governmental actor for constitutional
purposes.
210. Id. at 243. The district court restated the test for permissible gender
discrimination as whether the discrimination serves an important governmental
objective and whether the interest is substantially related to achieve the result. Id.
(citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Further, the court stated: "In
limited circumstances, a gender based classification favoring one sex can be justi-
fied if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportion-
ately burdened." Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogen, 458 U.S. 718,
728 (1982)) (internal quotations omitted).
211. Kelley, 832 F. Supp at 243.
212. Id. at 242. Initially, the district court dismissed the equal protection
claim after finding no violation. Id. The district court noted that to prevail on a
conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must first demonstrate an equal protection violation.
Id. Therefore, the district court also dismissed the conspiracy claim after dis-
missing the equal protection claim. Id.
213. Id. The district court stated that it was likely the male swimmers' plight
was never envisioned by Congress when it passed Title IX. Id. This ties into plain-
tiffs' argument that Title IX was solely designed to be a statute of expansion of
opportunities, not constriction of opportunities.
214. Id.
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the Seventh Circuit.21 5 The Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Illinois.216
On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that Title IX had been trans-
formed into "a statute that mandates discrimination against
males." 21 7 Plaintiffs then presented a hypothetical, designed to
illustrate the irrationality of the district court's interpretation of Ti-
de IX:
If a university is required by Title IX to eliminate men
from varsity athletic competition then the same Title IX
[sh] ould require the university to eliminate women from
the academic departments where they are over-repre-
sented and men from departments where they have been
over-represented. Such a result would be ridiculous. 218
The Seventh Circuit stated that the regulations implementing Title
IX were valid agency-promulgated regulations that merited defer-
ence by the court.2 19 The Seventh Circuit then answered plaintiffs'
assertion that the Policy Interpretation's "substantial proportional-
ity" test establishes a quota system.220 The Seventh Circuit re-
sponded by reasoning that the numerical goals of substantial
proportionality are not a requirement of Title IX.22 1 Rather, they
merely create a presumption that a school is in compliance with
Title IX.222 The court termed "substantial proportionality" a safe
215. Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63
USLW 3488 (1995).
216. Id. at 272-73.
217. Id. at 270. The plaintiffs claimed that bureaucratic regulation was the
catalyst for the change in Title IX. Id.
218. Id. The Seventh Circtgit agreed that the proposed result was ridiculous.
Id. The Seventh Circuit then stated that Congress termed discrimination in ath-
letic programs a unique problem. Id.
219. Id. See also Chevron U.SA. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
220. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270. The plaintiffs argued that a quota system contra-
venes Title IX. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. The Seventh Circuit was silent on the issue of whether Title IX would
be unconstitutional if it mandated substantial proportionality. Id. at n.6. The
court stated that Tide IX does not require that schools achieve substantial propor-
tionality. Id. at 270. The court noted that schools can achieve Title IX compli-
ance by demonstrating that "it has a continuing practice of increasing the athletic
opportunities of the underrepresented gender or that its existing programs effec-
tively accommodate the interests of that sex." Id. It is nearly impossible for a
school to show continuing expansion in light of budget deficits. See infra, notes
285-96 and accompanying text. It is also difficult to accommodate all interests
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harbor for schools. 223 The Seventh Circuit next stated that Title IX
does not require a university to support parallel teams. Thus, une-
qual disbanding is permissible.2 24 The Seventh Circuit lauded Title
IX's flexibility,. stating that it permits universities to choose from
many options in complying with Title IX.225
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' Fourteenth
Amendment arguments. 226 The Seventh Circuit stated that Illinois
only terminated the men's swimming program based on gender in
order to comply with Title IX-a valid federal statute. 227 The Sev-
enth Circuit dismissed any attack on Title IX's constitutionality be-
cause the court found that Title IX's purpose was to remedy past
discrimination.2 28 The Seventh Circuit emphatically stated that
remedying sexual discrimination was an important governmental
objective.2 29
The Seventh Circuit then addressed the plaintiffs' argument
that program elimination without expansion of opportunities for
women evidences that Title IX is not substantially related to the
goal of remedying past discrimination.2 30 In response, the Seventh
Circuit reiterated that Tide IX is not a statute that mandates expan-
when there is no substantial proportionality because substantial proportionality
presumes that interests are effectively accommodated. Id.
223. Id. at 271.
224. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted the flexible approach seemingly offered
by Title IX as evidenced by its lack of a requirement that a university require paral-
lel teams in all sports. Id.
225. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271. The court seemingly ignored the constraints of
athletic budgets and ignored the practical lesson taught by all of the Title IX cases:
constriction of male athletic programs is the only safe way to comply with Title IX.
226. Id. at 272.
227. Id. The Seventh Circuit ignored the fact that compliance with Title IX
was a secondary concern for Illinois: The cuts were sparked by budget reductions.
Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237, 240 (C.D. Il. 1993), 35 F.3d 265 (7th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 USLW 3488 (1995).
228. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271. The Seventh Circuit cited Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1990), for the proposition that Congress has vast
power under the Due Process Clause to remedy past discrimination. The Seventh
Circuit did not distinguish racial discrimination, the subject of Metro Broadcasting,
from sexual discrimination. Nor did the Seventh Circuit mention that Metro Broad-
casting is often criticized for its remedial discrimination language.
229. Keley, 35 F.3d at 272. See also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 728 (1982). The Seventh Circuit noted that plaintiffs never argued that
remedying sexual discrimination was not an important governmental objective.
Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272.
230. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272.
[Vol. II: p. 51
36
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol2/iss1/4
PROGRESS IN GENDER EQUITY
sion-team elimination is a valid means of compliance with Title
IX.231
The holdings by the district court and the Seventh Circuit in
Kelley essentially signal the death knell for small, non-mainstream
male athletic programs. The Kelley holdings firmly entrench team
elimination as a necessary method of compliance with Title IX and
end claims that Title IX is solely a statute for expanding opportuni-
ties. Similarly, in the next case, a court maintains the position that
elimination of men's teams is a valid method of complying with Ti-
de IX.
E. Gonyo v. Drake UniversitP32
1. Facts
In the 1992-93 academic year, Drake University (Drake) spon-
sored seven men's varsity athletic teams and five women's varsity
athletic teams.233 The male to female ratio for the twelve teams was
60.6% male and 39.4% female. 234 By comparison, the undergradu-
ate student body population during that time period consisted of
57.2% females and 42.8% males.23 5 On March 11, 1993, Drake
publicly announced its intention to discontinue men's varsity
wrestling due to financial concems and because other schools in
Drake's athletic conference discontinued their wrestling pro-
grams.23 6
231. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that Title IX enables decisions to consider
gender so that opportunities for women, the underrepresented gender, are not
reduced. Id.
232. 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
233. Id. at 996.
234. Id. at 992. Drake spent roughly 53% of its athletic scholarships on wo-
men athletes and 47% on men's athletic scholarships in 1992-93. Id. at 992-93.
Excluding football, Drake expended 71% of its overall nonscholarship budget on
men's Division I and Division III level sports while only spending 29% on women's
Division I sports. Id. at 993. In comparing the Division I sports (excluding foot-
ball), the district court found that Drake spent 65% of its overall nonscholarship
athletic budget on men's sports and 35% on women's athletics. Id. As for the
overall athletic budget (excluding football), Drake spent 52.9% on men's Division
I sports and 47.1% on women's sports. Id. As to the total expenditures of the
athletic budget, the district court found that Drake spent 56% on men's sports at
Division I or Division III levels and spent 44% on women's sports. In Divisions I
and III sports, 24.7% were women and 75.3% were men. Considering participa-
tion in only Division I sports, 39.4% were women and 60.6% were men. These two
sets of figures are in stark contrast to the undergraduate enrollment figures: 52.7%
female, 42.8% men. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. Drake cited "lack of support by the students and community for the
wrestling program" as its reasons. Id. Further, the court noted that "[w]restling is
not a revenue producing sport, such as football and basketball. In recent years,
1995]
37
Forseth: Progress in Gender Equity: An Overview of the History and Future
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
88 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM
2. Background
Plaintiffs, members of the men's wrestling team, filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
seeking a preliminary injunction ordering Drake to reinstate the
men's wrestling program.28 7 Plaintiffs brought suit alleging: (1)
Drake's action violated Title IX and that Title IX was unconstitu-
tional as applied; (2) Drake's decision violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) Drake breached its
contract with the plaintiffs. 23 8
The district court did not address the merits of the Title IX
claim. Instead, the court considered only whether a preliminary
injunction should be issued.23 9 Plaintiffs claimed that Drake's deci-
sion to discontinue the wrestling program constituted gender dis-
crimination in violation of Title IX.24 More specifically, plaintiffs
stated that Drake's decision violated Title IX because more athletic
scholarship dollars went to women student athletes.2 41 The plain-
tiffs argued that the regulations required that each sex have reason-
able opportunity to receive athletic scholarships proportionate to
each gender's participation in intercollegiate athletics.242
3. Analysis
After considering all the factors for issuing a preliminary in-
junction, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion.243 Plain-
tiffs asserted that if the preliminary injunction was not issued, they
would not be able to complete their intercollegiate wrestling ca-
many other colleges and universities, due to budget constraints, have discontinued
their wrestling programs at the Division I level .... " Id.
237. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 990.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 993. In order for a district court to grant a preliminary injunction,
the plaintiffs must show: (1) a threat of irreparable harm; (2) a balance of that
harm and the possible injury inflicted on others if the injunction is granted; (3)
the probability of succeeding on the merits of the case; and (4) the public interest
involved. Id. (citing Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. CL Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113
(8th Cir. 1981)).
240. Id. at 990. Although other claims were set forth, the Title IX discrimina-
tion allegations were the main thrust of the plaintiffs' action and therefore most
analysis was based on the Title IX claim. Id.
241. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(1)). Drake was also violating Title IX
by providing more athletic opportunities for men. Id.
242. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 995.
243. Id. at 996. A preliminary injunction would have required Drake to rein-
state the wrestling program and fund it until the case was decided on the merits.
Id.
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reers at Drake.244 However, the district court found that no irrepa-
rable harm would occur because the affected wrestlers were free to
transfer to other schools to continue wrestling.245 The district
court held that "the harm to the plaintiffs in failing to issue a pre-
liminary injunction is not in the nature of harm to their legal
rights."246
In considering the potential harm to Drake as well as to the
plaintiffs, the district court found that the scale tipped in favor of
Drake and, therefore, it did not issue the injunction. 247 In this de-
termination, the district court recognized two injuries that an in-
junction could create. First, Drake would be under a considerable
financial burden if it were forced to maintain a wrestling team for
the 1993-94 season. 248 Second, institutions of higher education en-
joy the prerogative of allocating their resources as they see fit with-
out judicial directive. 249 The district court stated that any
impingement on that prerogative requires a showing of irreparable
harm.2 50 The district court concluded by stating: "that the harm to
Drake in issuing a preliminary injunction is far greater than the
harm to plaintiffs in not doing so."251
The district court then addressed the final element for deter-
mining a preliminary injunction-the probability that plaintiffs will
244. Id. The district court noted that the plaintiffs' desire to finish their edu-
cation at Drake was laudable and understandable, but Title IX does not establish
right to participate in intercollegiate athletics. There is also no constitutional right
to participate in intercollegiate athletics. Id. at 994.
245. Id. at 993. All but one of the wrestlers transferred to other universities
and planned to continue their intercollegiate wrestling careers. Id. Further, the
district court found that "[n]o wrestler currently under scholarship at Drake has
been denied continued scholarship availability through their anticipated gradua-
tion date, so long as they remain eligible for such scholarships under the univer-
sity's athletic scholarship guidelines." Id. at 992.
246. Id. at 994. Having concluded that no legal rights were involved, the dis-
trict court noted that, for a preliminary injunction to be granted, the plaintiffs
must be able to ultimately prevail on the merits of the case. Id.
247. Gonyo, 835 F. Supp. at 994.
248. Id. It would have been possible to assemble a 1993-94 wrestling team,
but at great cost to the university. Id. The district court did not consider this to be
a viable option, considering that the initial cuts were made as a result of university-
wide cutbacks. Id. at 992.
249. Id. The district court stated that "[a] cademic freedom, of course, does
not immunize defendants from civil liability, including injunctive relief, for any
violations of the law.... but courts should be very cautious about overriding, even
temporarily, a school's decisions in these areas, especially absent a showing that
plaintiffs are likely to ultimately prevail." Id. (internal citations omitted).
250. Id. at 996. The district court noted that overriding this prerogative is
possible only if there is a showing that "the plaintiffs are likely to ultimately pre-
vail." Id.
251. Id. at 995.
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succeed on the merits of the claim.252 Plaintiffs claimed that Drake
violated Title IX when it discontinued the men's wrestling pro-
gram.2 5 3 Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that Title IX is unconstitu-
tional, based on the Equal Protection Clause, as it applied to
them.254 However, the district court concluded that the plain-
tiffs would be unlikely to prevail on these issues.2 55 As to the
Title IX violation, plaintiffs relied heavily on the disparity in the
scholarship awards for men and women.256 However, plaintiffs'
scholarships were not rescinded and the district court ques-
tioned plaintiffs' standing to bring the claim.257 Further, the dis-
trict court questioned the validity of the remedy requested.258
The district court concluded that Drake had "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons" for the disparity in scholarship allo-
cations offered to men and women.2 59 Therefore, the district
252. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 995.
253. Id.
254. Id. In assessing the Title IX constitutionality claim, the district court
weighed heavily the fact that the plaintiffs had not lost their athletic scholarships.
Id.
255. Id. The district court noted that "the purposes of [Title IX] are to avoid
having federal resources used in support of discriminatory practices and to protect
individuals against such practices." Id. Further, the district court observed that
Tide IX is a remedial statute designed to protect women, who were historically
underrepresented in Drake's athletic program, and to eviscerate past discrimina-
tory treatment against them. Id.
256. Id. Tide IX states that "no person shall, on the basis of gender, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... ." Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988)) (internal quotations
omitted). The district court stated that historically, women and not men were un-
derrepresented at Drake. Id. at 996.
257. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 995. In order for the male students to have a valid
claim, they must be able to show that they were discriminated against solely on the
basis of their gender. Id. at 996. Plaintiffs were unable to do so. Id. Showing
gender discrimination against the male students was particularly difficult because
the plaintiffs did not lose their scholarships. Id. at 995.
258. Id. The district court doubted that ordering a reinstatement of the wres-
tling team would be effective to eradicate a Title IX violation. Id. Further, the
district court found that "injunctive relief might well undermine the underlying
purpose of Tide IX, which is to protect the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted." Id. at 996.
259. Id. at 995. Even if Drake had a discriminatory purpose for eliminating
the wrestling team, "[u]nder HEW policy interpretation, if any resulting disparity
in this respect can be explained by adjustments taking into account legitimate,
nondiscriminatory factors, then an institution may be found to be in compliance
with Title IX." Id. (quoting Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,415). Further,
the district court noted that three-fourths of the student-athletes are male, and
three-fourths of its nonscholarship athletic budget goes to men's sports even
though they constituted a minority in the student body. Id. Finally, the district
court noted that "the record fails to show that plaintiffs are, on the basis of their
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court found plaintiffs' claim that Drake violated Title IX to be
meritless.2 60
Plaintiffs also challenged Drake's action on the grounds that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.261 Plaintiffs first asserted that by cutting the wrestling team,
Drake violated the Equal Protection Clause.262 The district court
found that because Drake, as a private university, was not acting
under "color of state law," Drake's actions could not be considered
"state action." Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause did not ap-
ply to Drake.2 63 Moreover, the district court found that Title IX was
constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. 2M
The court also summarily disposed of the plaintiffs' state law
breach of contract claim.265 Because Drake continued to honor its
outstanding scholarships and because there was no evidence of any
other existing contracts between Drake and the plaintiffs, the dis-
trict court concluded that no contracts were breached. 266 In reach-
ing this conclustion, the district court noted that public interest
"weighs in favor of pennitting colleges and universities to chart
gender, excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, or subjected to
discrimination in Drake's athletic program." Id. at 996.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 994.
262. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 994. However, a cause of action based on the
Equal Protection Clause must be brought against someone who acted under the
color of state law by depriving a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured
by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988)).
263. Id. (citing Imperiale v. Hahnemann Univ., 966 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1992)
(per curiam); Imperiale v. Hahnemann Univ., 776 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(setting forth standard for valid Equal Protection claim)).
264. Id. at 996. The court noted that the plaintiffs provided no evidence to
support the claim of unconstitutionality other than a showing that other Division I
wrestling programs are being phased out. Id. Further, Drake did not consider
Title IX in determining to disband the wrestling program. Id. The court com-
mented that there is no constitutional right to participate in college athletics and
summarily dismissed the validity of the claim. Id. Further, the court noted that
"Drake is trying to remedy disparity in its athletic programs by encouraging greater
athletic participation by women through scholarship offerings to them. It is wo-
men, not men who have historically been and still are underrepresented in Drake's
athletic program." Id.
265. Id. at 994.
266. Id. at 994-95. However, the court was troubled by the fact that top Drake
officials knew for several years that the wrestling program might be abolished. Id.
at 995 n.3. Top officials at Drake allowed the wrestling coach to continue to re-
cruit students, not disclosing the fact that the team would be cut, under the pre-
tense that Drake was "total[ly] committed" to the wrestling program. Id.
Additionally, the court noted that if the students knew in advance that the wres-
tling team would be dropped, they probably would not have attended Drake and
the team could have been disbanded because of lack of wrestlers. Id.
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their own course in providing athletic opportunities without judi-
cial interference or oversight, absent a clear showing that they are
in violation of the law."2 67
Kelley and Gonyo represent a defeat at the judicial level for male
athletes caught in the wake of universities' attempts to comply with
Title IX. The Seventh Circuit's holding in Kelley and the district
court's decision in Gonyo demonstrate that elimination of athletic
programs, rather than expansion of programs with additional op-
portunities for women, is an acceptable method of achieving com-
pliance with Title IX.26s Further, these decisions implicitly permit
reverse discrimination against male athletes in the name of Title IX
compliance.
V. IMPACT OF TITLE IX LITIGATION
In the last twenty-three years, Title IX has undergone substan-
tial changes in its application and enforcement ability. In light of
these changes, Title IX compliance has become a great concern
among intercollegiate athletic departments. Universities must de-
termine what constitutes compliance to avoid costly gender discrim-
ination litigation and monetary damages.2 69 The recent litigation
discussed in this Comment establishes guidelines for universities to
consider when attempting to achieve Title IX compliance in inter-
collegiate varsity athletic programs. Further, these cases provide a
glimpse into the future of Title IX litigation.
A. Title IX Compliance in the 1990's
The goals of Title IX are clear: universities must provide stu-
dent-athletes with an equal opportunity to participate in intercolle-
giate athletics.2 70 Recent litigation clearly establishes that the
courts will focus solely on the three-prong Policy Interpretation test
to determine Title IX compliance.2 71 A university is deemed to be
267. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 996.
268. Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
63 USLW 3488 (1995).
269. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnet County, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
270. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d
332 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809
F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Cook v. Colgate
Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
271. Courts will disregard a university's compliance with any other provision
in the regulations. Courts may consider twelve other factors in assessing compli-
ance with the equal athletic opportunity regulation. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1)
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in compliance with Title IX if it satisfies one of the three prongs of
the Policy Interpretation test.272 Therefore, it is necessary to deter-
mine what courts have held that each of the three prongs requires.
The first prong, substantial proportionality, has been inter-
preted by the courts as requiring a tight numerical fit between ath-
letic participation and undergraduate enrollment.2 73 As Cohen,274
Roberts275 and Favia276 suggest, only a small disparity between
athletic participation and student enrollment is acceptable, and
ideally, universities should attempt to demonstrate identical per-
centages.2 77
The second prong of the test has been interpreted by the
courts as requiring a university to exhibit a history and a continuing
practice of program expansion for members of the under-
represented sex.278 As evidenced by Roberts and Favia, the courts
have focused on the continuing practice of program expansion.2 79
Thus, the university must be able to demonstrate that it has recently
added programs for the underrepresented sex and will continue to
do so in the future.280
The third prong of the Policy Interpretation test has been in-
terpreted by the courts as requiring a university to fully and effec-
tively accommodate the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex. 28 1 The First Circuit in Cohen explained the
(1994). For example, in Cohen, the district court found that Brown University satis-
fied HEW regulations regarding the competitive schedules; however, the district
court concluded that Brown was not in compliance with Title IX because it failed
to satisfy the three-prong test. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 994.
272. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993).
273. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418. For a full discussion of
the first prong of the Policy Interpretation test, see supra notes 34-42 and accompa-
nying text.
274. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. 978.
275. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub norr. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
276. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d
332 (3rd Cir. 1993).
277. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1518 (noting disparity of 1.7% is acceptable).
278. Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418. For a full discussion of the
second prong of the Policy Interpretation test, see supra notes 35-43 and accompa-
nying text.
279. See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1516.
280. Few universities can show a continuing practice of program expansion
because universities are eliminating programs due to budget constraints. See Co-
hen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993).
281. Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418. A university need not ex-
pend resources in order to create new women's teams for sports in which no fe-
males have an interest or for sports that would not have any reasonable
expectation of competition. SeeJohnson, supra note 18, at 587 (commenting on
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accommodation requirement by stating that a university must pro-
vide 250 athletic slots if 250 athletes demonstrate an interest and
ability to compete.28 2 Further, precedent establishes that a univer-
sity must maintain a varsity team for the underrepresented sex be-
cause the mere existence of a varsity team demonstrates sufficient
interest and ability to sustain the team.283 In addition, a university
may be required to add varsity teams for the underrepresented sex
if club teams have expressed an interest in becoming varsity
sports.284
B. The Future of Intercollegiate Athletic Programs
As university spending decreases, athletic programs will have
difficulty complying with Title IX.285 Title IX apparently requires
universities to add women's teams and, therefore, make other pro-
gram cuts if necessary.2 86 Questions arise as to which athletic pro-
grams may be disbanded and how universities should structure
their athletic programs in order to comply with Title IX. Clearly, a
university may not eliminate women's varsity teams unless these cuts
will enable the university to satisfy the three-prong Policy Interpre-
tation test.287 Furthermore, universities cannot restructure athletic
Policy Interpretation to selection of sports). For a full discussion of the third
prong of the Policy Interpretation test, see supra notes 42-43.
282. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899.
283. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen, 991 F.2d 888; Favia, 812 F. Supp. 578; Kelley
v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 63 USLW 3488 (1995); Roberts, 814 F. Supp. 1507.
284. In Cook v. Colgate University, the Second Circuit vacated an order by
the district court to promote a women's club ice hockey team to varsity status only
because the judgement was mooted by the graduation of the named plaintiffs. 992
F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1993). However, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York held that Colgate's failure to promote women's ice
hockey to varsity status violated Title IX. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737,
751 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
285. See generally Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 n.15. Program expansion for female
athletes requires significant funding. The only option available to universities will
be to terminate men's programs to provide adequate funding for women's teams.
SeeJohnson, supra note 18, at 584.
286. Johnson, supra note 18, at 584.
287. Cohen, 991 F.2d 888. For many universities, disbanding women's pro-
grams is not a viable solution because many universities are not currently in com-
pliance with Title IX. SeeJohnson, supra note 18, at 584 (stating that universities
should conduct own self-evaluation before making any cuts). A university could
simultaneously eliminate both men's and women's teams which may lead to sub-
stantial proportionality. This solution may also be problematic because disbanding
both men's and women's sports produces an effect which is entirely contrary to the
purpose of Title IX. Further, the "abilities and interests" of the underrepresented
sex would clearly not be satisfied. Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418.
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programs and rely on a lack of funding as a cognizable defense
under Title IX.288 Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the alterna-
tives available to universities facing noncompliance.
Universities have several options available to achieve Title IX
compliance. First, a university could abolish the entire varsity ath-
letic program. 289  This would eliminate the gender equity
problems. At the same time, however, this action may severely dam-
age the athletic reputation and prominence of the university.290
This action may also threaten the university's financial interests if
the university derives a substantial amount of revenue from these
programs. Similarly, this extreme solution harms all athletes, men
and women alike.
A second alternative may be to eliminate men's varsity pro-
grams and expand women's teams until the ratio of male and fe-
male athletes is substantially proportionate.2 91 This alternative is
often criticized and has been labeled as inequitable, 292 but it may
be a feasible solution to the problem. By eliminating some men's
288. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 585 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7
F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1518
(D. Colo.), aff'd in part and rev'd and part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cook, 802 F.
Supp. at 750.
289. Teresa M. Miguel, Title IX and Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: Case
Analysis Legal Implication and the Movement Toward Compliance, 1 SPORTS L. J. 279,
299 (1994).
290. A university would be affected by abolishing its athletic department in
the following areas: decrease of enrollment, decrease in endowments and de-
crease or complete loss of booster and/or alumni funding. Despite the fact that a
university's academic reputation is exclusive of its athletic reputation, the loss of an
entire athletic program would impact the academic growth of the university by
questioning its moral status and commitment to a full rounded education, equality
and fairness. Furthermore, a trend towards eliminating varsity sports programs
would reshape amateur athletics, as well as severely limiting the scholarship oppor-
tunities to a wide range of society.
291. Non-revenue producing sports without a female counterpart will be the
most vulnerable.
292. SeeJohnson, supra note 18, at 197 (quoting Jamison Hensley, Terps Cut
Men's Scholarships, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 19, 1993, at 5C ("We don't want to en-
hance the women's teams by taking away from the men's programs and their com-
petitiveness.... We have to find other ways to enhance the women's programs.")
(quoting Sue Tyler, University of Maryland Associate Athletic Director, comment-
ing on the university's response to an OCR Title IX investigation report));
Katheryn Reith, NCAA Gender Equity Committee Report Is Final, THE WOMEN'S SPORTS
EXPERIENCE, Sept./Oct. 1993, at 7, 8 ("The reasons why we want to increase sports
opportunities for women, the benefits you get from taking part in sports, are no
less true for male athletes than female.... Some schools may take the easy way out
and just cut opportunities for some students and give them to others." (quoting
Nancy Hogshead, President of the Women's Sports Foundation, expressing con-
cern about the practice of eliminating men's programs in order to provide oppor-
tunities for women)).
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varsity teams, the university would be able to use the funding to
expand women's varsity teams, thereby bringing the athletic pro-
gram into compliance with Title IX.
Universities could also eliminate or reduce the size of and
funding for their football teams.2 93 By reducing the number of
football scholarships and participation opportunities, a university
could re-distribute these saved dollars to increase athletic opportu-
nities for women.2 94 Additionally, by reducing or eliminating the
football program, the large disparity in substantial proportionality
would be reduced because the size of the football team often ac-
counts for these large disparities.2 95 However, the feasibility of this
alternative may be severely limited in situations where football pro-
duces the majority of revenue used to operate the other athletic
programs.
Many athletic directors and male student athletes find these
alternatives unworkable and inequitable. Currently, however, uni-
versities are given few other choices. The courts have made it clear
that the university has the responsibility to provide an equal oppor-
tunity to participate. Therefore, a university may be forced to insti-
tute these inequitable alternatives or face the substantial cost of
Title IX noncompliance.2 96
293. Harris, supra note 44, at 709. The reduction of the football team has
long been recognized by many commentators as the best possible solution because
football is the largest sport on most campuses in terms of the amount of funding,
number of scholarships (85 in 1994-95) and number of coaches allowed (12). See
also NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1993-94 NCAA DMvrsION I OPER-
ATING MANUAL 11.7.2, 15.5.5.1 (1994). In response to this viable solution, the Col-
lege Football Association (CFA) has asked Congress to amend Title IX by
excluding football from the equation used to determine compliance. Mike Zapler,
Coaches of Major Football Teams Ask Congress to Help Revamp Enforcement of Title IX
CHRON. HIGHER ED.,Jan. 6, 1995, at A44. Success of CFA's request seems unlikely.
As stated by Christine Frank, Director of Women's Athletics at the University of
Iowa, "(f]ootball teams tried this in the 1970's trying to get exempt. There is no
way they were going to win then and there is no way they are going to win now."
Id.
294. Two universities have recently instituted this alternative. California State
University at Fullerton and California State University at Long Beach dropped
their football programs, creating an additional 100 varsity slots and an additional
$400,000 of scholarship money. Debra E. Blum, Hard to Meet Goals of Gender Equity,
CHRON. HIGHER ED., Oct. 26, 1994, at A51.
295. Johnson, supra note 18, at 584. For example, Robert Jacoby athletic di-
rector at Stetson University, attributes the university's success at balancing its ath-
letic opportunities and budget to the university's lack of a football team; women
student-athletes make up 53% of the athletes and 48% of the scholarships. Debra
E. Blum, Stetson University Works, CHRON. HIGHER En., Oct 26, 1994, at AS1.
296. Jennifer L. Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commit-
ment to Fairness, 5 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 133, 158 (1995); see alsoJanet Judge, et.
al., Gender Equity in the 1990's: An Athletic Administrator's Survival Guide to Title IX
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C. The Future of Title IX Litigation
Initially, Tide IX litigation focused on whether universities
were providing adequate participation opportunities for female stu-
dent-athletes. However, the focus of future Tide IX litigation may
be broader-for instance, male student-athletes may file reverse dis-
crimination suits under Tide IX.297
Although Tide IX, on its face, prohibits discrimination and re-
quires universities to provide equal athletic opportunities for both
men and women, recent litigation suggests that Tide IX prohibits
only discrimination against women.298 As Gonyo and Kelley establish,
male student-athletes attending universities presently not in compli-
ance with Title IX will be foreclosed from pursuing Title IX litiga-
and Gender Equity Compliance 5 SETON HALL J. SPoRT L. 313 (1995) (discussing
alternatives for Title IX compliance).
297. See Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. 111. 1993), aff'd, 35
F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 USLW 3488 (1995); Gonyo v. Drake Univ.,
837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993). Tide IX is similarly being used by women to
demand equal pay in the field of coaching intercollegiate athletics. Stanley v. Uni-
versity of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994); Tyler v. Howard Univ., CA. No. 91-
CA11239 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1993). As demonstrated by a 1992 NCAA report, this
area seems ripe for litigation. See Glenn M. Wong & Carol A. Barr, Title IX Takes
Some New Turns, SPORTS LAWYER, Jan./Feb., 1994 at 3, 5 (citing NCAA report "Wo-
men in Intercollegiate Sports"). The NCAA report indicated that the average head
coaching salary total for coaches at Division IA institutions was $396,791 for male
coaches compared to $206,106 for female. Id. Though there is a clear discrepancy
in salaries, the issue of equal pay is fraught with complexities.
The OCR has established a list of seven criteria to be used in assessing com-
pensation for coaches: rate of compensation of coaches; duration of contracts;
conditions relating to renewal; experience; nature of coaching duties performed;
working conditions; and other terms and conditions of employment. Id. In addi-
tion, the OCR states that women coaches must demonstrate that lower compensa-
tion of the female coaches negatively affects the female athletes. Id. These OCR
guidelines and recommendations have yet to be clarified or tested and the effect
on future litigation is ambiguous. Further, it has long been accepted that certain
men's sports coaches receive more compensation than their female counterparts
because of the nature of and the revenue produced in their sport. Jacobs v. Col-
lege of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 661
F.2d 922 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1981). Though these requirements
may seem to impede the claims of female coaches, recent litigation suggests that
these claims may be successful. However, further litigation and regulation is
needed to establish a clear standard for determining whether there is a disparity
between men's and women's coaching compensation that violates Title IX.
298. C.f Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900 n.17 (1st Cir. 1993) (characterizing Title IX as
benefiting only women is "isthmian view" of world). Male student-athletes may
also attempt to bring equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 990; Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 239. In analyzing gender based
equal protection claims, courts generally attempt to determine whether the rules
or actions under challenge satisfy an important state interest or whether the rule
or action has a rational relationship to a legitimate organizational purpose. Kelley,
832 F. Supp. at 243. The argument supporting the discontinuation of male ath-
letic programs is that an important governmental interest lies in compliance with
Title IX to offset the historical discrimination against women. Id.
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tion for two reasons. First, Title IX is designed to protect members
of the underrepresented sex.2 99 Because men presently constitute
the majority of athletes in university athletic programs, men are not
members of the underrepresented sex Title IX was designed to
protect.
Second, Title IX is designed to protect members of a sex who
historically have been denied opportunities to participate in inter-
collegiate athletics. Men have not been denied this opportunity in
the past, and, therefore, male athletes cannot file a Title IX suit
asserting this ground. Unfortunately, given the difficult economic
times in higher education and the lack of protection provided by
Title IX, male student-athletes may be without recourse.300 How-
ever, as more male athletic programs are disbanded, Congress may
be forced to reevaluate Title IX's purpose and undo judicial inter-
pretation that permits reverse discrimination under Title IX.
In addition to male athletes filing Title IX lawsuits, female ath-
letes will continue to seek redress under Title IX. Because the vast
majority of colleges and universities are not complying with the re-
quirements of Title IX, female athletes will continue to seek re-
lief.3 0 1 Recent litigation suggests that courts are receptive to the
concerns of female athletes.
Courts and universities are finally recognizing the seriousness
of Title IX violations. Title IX compliance is expected, and univer-
sities must make difficult choices. The success of female plaintiffs
in recent litigation and the potential for continued success in the
future poses significant challenges for university athletic programs
attempting to comply with Title IX. Lawyers, teachers, fans and ath-
letes will all be affected by these challenges and choices.
Renee Forseth
Jennifer Karam
Eric J Sobocinski
299. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 28, at 71,418.
300. Although no legal grounds exist under Title IX, as male athletic pro-
grams are adversely affected by compliance, it is possible that reverse discrimina-
tion claims will gain acceptance in the courts. Another option may be a
resurrection of the Tower Amendment. For a discussion of the Tower Amend-
ment, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
301. See Chick Ludwig, Gender Equity: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, STAR TRiB-
UNE, Nov. 21, 1993, at 8C (quoting Arthur Bryant and Donna Lopiano).
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